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The present report has been realized in the framework of the European project “Lawyers 
for the protection of fundamental rights” GA n° 806974) and specifically within the work 
package on the review of the European legal framework on fundamental rights. Against 
this background, the beneficiaries of the said project chose to focus the analysis on two 
specific topics: 
1) Family law and rights of the child, and in particular the right to family 
reunification; 
2) Criminal law, and in particular fight against terrorism and the relevant rights of 
defendants, of pre-trial detainees and persons under investigation. 
The present report explores the second topic on “The Fight against Terrorism in the 
European Union: Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters and Procedural Rights”, 
realized by Mar Jimeno Bulnes, Julio Pérez Gil and Félix Valbuena González with the 
support of Cristina Ruiz López. Professors of Procedural Law. University of Burgos. 
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 Chapter VI of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(henceforth CFREU) is dedicated to Justice rights (Arts. 47-50) that provide fundamental 
procedural rights, whose origin must be essentially found in Art. 6 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) regulating the right to a ‘fair trial’ in general terms 
with consequent case law delivered by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)1. 
This essential background must be balanced with the general policy proposed by the 
European Union on the field of judicial cooperation in criminal matters and the principles 
supporting it in order to combat terrorism and organized crime in all Member States2.  
 As known, judicial cooperation in criminal matters is contemplated in Art. 82 (1) 
of the TFEU which provides ‘the principle of mutual recognition of judgements and 
judicial decisions’ as legal basis together with the principle of ‘approximation of the laws 
and regulations of the Member States’ in order to ensure ‘recognition throughout the 
Union of all forms of judgements and judicial decisions’3. Both principles justify today’s 
enactment of different procedural instruments related to criminal proceedings in order to 
make judicial cooperation between Member States possible for the purposes of fighting 
criminality and delinquency on the one hand as well as guaranteeing procedural 
safeguards of individuals (suspects and victims) in criminal proceedings on the other 
hand4.  
 
1 See generally TRECHSEL, S. Human rights in criminal proceedings, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2005. Also, in relation with confluence between ECHR and CFREU see KOKOTT, J. and SOBOTA, C. 
(eds.) “Protection of fundamental rights in the European Union: on the relationship between EU 
fundamental rights, the European Convention and national standards of protection”, Yearbook of European 
Law 2015, vol. 34, n. 1, pp. 60-73. In concrete relation with EU and AFSJ see BANACH-GUTIÉRREZ, J. 
and HARDING, C. “Fundamental rights in European Criminal Justice: an axiological perspective”, 
European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 2012, vol. 20, n. 3, pp. 239-264, analysing 
fundamental rights included in the Justice chapter. For an approach to fair trial’s right as contemplated in 
Art. 47 CFREU, see GALERA RODRIGO, S. “The right to a fair trial in the European Union: lights and 
shadows”, Revista de Investigaçoes Constitucionais 2015, vol. 2, n. 2, pp. 7-29; also DOOBAY, A. “The 
right to a fair trial in light of the recent ECtHR and CJEU case law”, ERA Forum 2013, vol. 14, n. 2, pp. 
251-262 with comments to specific case law.  
2 See specifically DOUGLAS-SCOTT, S. “The rule of law in the European Union – putting the security 
into the area of freedom, security and justice”, European Law Review 2004, vol. 29, n. 4, pp. 219-242. Also 
MITSILEGAS, V. “Transnational Criminal Law and the global rule of law”, in G. Ziccardi Capaldo (ed.), 
The global community yearbook of International Law and jurisprudence, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2017, pp. 47-80. 
3 On conjunction of both principles for the functioning of AFSJ see JIMENO-BULNES, M. Un proceso 
europeo para el siglo XXI, Civitas & Thomson Reuters, Madrid, 2011, pp. 33 ff. On mutual recognition 
principle specifically OUWERKERK, J. Quid pro quo. A comparative laws perspective on the mutual 
recognition of judicial decisions in criminal matters, Intersentia, Antwerpen, 2011.  
4 See specifically SPRONKEN, T., VERMEULEN, G., DE VOCHT, D. and VAN PUYENBROECK, L. 
(eds.) EU procedural rights in criminal proceedings, Maklu, Antwerpen, Apeldoorn, Portland, 2009, also 
resulting from European project funded by European Commission (Directorate General of Justice and 
Home Affairs). In terms of conjunction of both policies on mutual recognition instruments and protection 
of procedural rights see HODGSON, J. “EU criminal justice: the challenge of due process rights within a 
8 
 At the time, before the enforcement of the Treaty of Lisbon5 in 2009 and the 
creation of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) currently contemplated in 
Title V, Arts. 67-89 of the TFEU, no legal regulation on principle of mutual recognition 
existed, and judicial cooperation in criminal matters was part of the so-called prior Third 
Pillar of the Treaty on European Union joint with the police cooperation6. Nevertheless, 
the principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions was established by the Tampere 
European Council held on 15 and 16 October 1999 as ‘the cornerstone of judicial co-
operation in both civil and criminal matters within the Union’7. Also, the previous Cardiff 
European Council, held on 15 and 16 June 1998, pointed ‘the importance of effective 
judicial protection in the fight against cross-border crime’ asking the Council ‘to identify 
the scope for greater mutual recognition of decisions of each other’s courts’8.   
 On the other side, the Stockholm Programme 9  launched at the time by the 
European Council for the 2010-2014 period contemplated the possibility to extend mutual 
recognition to ‘all types of judgements and decisions of a judicial nature, which may, 
depending on the legal system, be either criminal or administrative’. Obvious to say as 
resulting of same programme that ‘mutual trust between authorities and services in the 
different Member States and decision-makers is the basis for efficient cooperation in this 
area’. Mutual trust works as an essential tool in this area, as shown by the application of 
instruments of mutual recognition, particularly the European Arrest Warrant application 
as the case law delivered by the Court of Justice of European Union (henceforth, CJEU) 
and national courts show10.  
 
framework of mutual recognition”, North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial 
Regulation 2011, vol. 37, n. 2, pp. 307-320.  
5 OJ, n. C 306, 17 December 2007; consolidated version in OJ, n. C 115, 9 May 2008 and OJ, n. C 83, 30 
March 2010, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (henceforth CFREU). 
See for example at the time PEERS, S. “EU Criminal Law and the Treaty of Lisbon”, European Law Review 
2008, vol. 33, n. 4, pp. 507-511. 
6 For a general approach then JIMENO-BULNES, M. “European judicial cooperation in criminal matters”, 
European Law Journal 2003, vol. 9, n. 5, pp. 614-630.  
7 Presidency Conclusions available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm, conclusion n. 
33. See ELSEN, C. “L’esprit et les ambitions de Tampere: une ère nouvelle pour la cooperation dans le 
domaine de la justice et des affaires intérieures?”, Revue du Marché commun et de l’Union européenne 
1999, n. 433, pp. 659-663.  
8 Presidency Conclusions available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/car1_en.htm, conclusion n. 
39.  
9 European Council, “An open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens”, OJ, n. C 115, 4 May 
2010, pp 1-38. See BARROT, J. “Le Programme de Stockholm 2010-2014: en march vers une communauté 
de citoyéns conscients de leurs droits et de leurs devoirs”, Revue du Droit de l’Union Européenne 2009, n. 
4, pp. 627-631; also Editorial Comment, “The EU as an area of freedom, security and justice: implementing 
the Stockholm programme”, Common Market Law Review 2010, vol. 47, n. 5, pp. 1307-1316.  
10 See HERLIN-KARNELL, E. “From mutual trust to the full effectiveness of EU Law: 10 years of the 
European Arrest Warrant”, European Current Law 2013, n. 4, pp. 373.388; more recently EFRAT, A. 
9 
 Especially on the field of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, the simultaneity 
in the regulation of procedural instruments under the employment of mutual recognition 
of judicial decisions between Member States has been proved as essential, together with 
the enactment of procedural safeguards in criminal proceedings for suspects and accused 
as well as victims, if such was the case. As it would certainly be impossible to analyse all 
of them, we have made a selection of those considered to be the most important 
instruments of mutual recognition of judicial decisions in criminal matters, namely: the 
European Arrest Warrant and the European Investigation Order on the one hand11; and 
on the other, from the perspective of procedural safeguards of individuals, the analysis of 
Directives on procedural rights of suspects in criminal proceedings together with the 
general framework on the topic, considering that regulation on protection of victims of 






2. EUROPEAN ARREST WARRANT 
  
2.1 General background 
 
 The Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant 
and the surrender procedures between the Member States (henceforth EAW or EAW 
 
“Assessing mutual trust among EU members: evidence from the European Arrest Warrant”, Journal of 
European Public Policy 2019, vol. 26, n. 5, pp. 656-675.  
11 About new perspectives on judicial cooperation in criminal matters along EU Member States see for 
example COSTA RAMOS, V. “Notas sobre novos desafios da cooperaçao judiciaira internacional em 
matéria penal”, Revista de Estudios Europeos 2019, n. 1, pp 184-205. In Spain recent and generally, for an 
overview of mutual recognition instruments, procedural rights of suspects and protection of victims in 
criminal procedure see JIMENO BULNES, M. (dir.) and MIGUEL BARRIO, R. (ed.), Espacio judicial 
europeo y proceso penal, Tecnos, Madrid, 2018. 
12 Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing 
minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council 
Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, OJ, n. L 315, 14 November 2012, pp. 57-73. Precisely, in relation 
with the balancing of rights of suspects and victims in criminal proceedings see KLIP, A. “On victim’s 
rights and its impact on the rights of the accused”, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal 
Justice 2015, vol. 23, n.3, p. 177-189; also, by same author recently “Fair trial rights in the European Union: 
reconciling accused and victims’ rights” in T. Rafaraci and R. Belfiore (eds.), EU Criminal Justice: 
fundamental rights, transnational proceedings and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, Springer, 
Cham (Switzerland), 2019, pp 3-25.  
10 
FWD, also known as ‘euro-warrant’)13, further amended by Council Framework Decision 
2009/299/JHA of 26 February 200914, was the first instrument enacted on the field of 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters in EU under the basis of the mutual recognition 
principle15. As defined in its first article, ‘the European arrest warrant is a judicial decision 
issued by a Member State with a view to the arrest and surrender by another Member 
State of a requested person, for the purpose of conducting a criminal proceeding or 
executing a custodial sentence or detention order’. Therefore, the EAW FWD creates 
compelling obligations to all Member States as long as all of them ‘shall execute any 
European arrest warrant on the basis of the principle of mutual recognition and in 
accordance with the provisions of this Framework Decision’ (Art. 1 (2) EAW). Only, ab 
initio, the observance of fundamental rights and principles ex Art. 6 TFEU appears to be 
 
13 OJ, n. L 190, 18 July 2002, pp. 1-18. In the literature see specifically comments by author, eg in English 
language as most recent contributions, JIMENO-BULNES, M. “The application of the European Arrest 
Warrant in the European Union: a general assessment”, in C. Fijnaut and J. Ouwerkerk (eds.), The future 
of police and judicial cooperation in the European Union, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 
2010, pp. 285-333; also, a literature review existing at the time on the topic is included.  
14 OJ, n. L 81, 27 March 2009, pp. 24-36, amending Framework Decisions 2002/584/JHA, 2005/214/JHA, 
2006/783/JHA, 2008/909/JHA and 2008/947/JHA, thereby enhancing the procedural rights of persons and 
fostering the application of the principle of mutual recognition to decisions rendered in the absence of the 
person concerned at the trial. On the topic see specifically In absentiEAW – Research project on European 
Arrest Warrants issued for the enforcement of sentences after in absentia trials at 
https://www.inabsentieaw.eu/, also funded by the European Union’s Justice Programme (2014-2020). In 
the literature BÖSE, M. “Harmonizing procedural rights indirectly: the Framework Decision on trials in 
absentia”, North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 2011, vol. 37, n. 2, 
pp. 489-510; also SIRACUSANO, F. “Reciproco riconoscimento elle decisione giudiziarie, procedura di 
consegna e processo in absentia”, Rivista italiana di Diritto e procedura penale 2010, n. 1, pp. 116-144.  
15 See some criticism by PEERS, S. “Mutual recognition and criminal law in the European Union: has the 
Council got it wrong?”, Common Market Law Review 2004, vol. 41, n. 1, pp. 5-36 as well as THOMAS, J. 
“The principle of mutual recognition – success or failure?”, ERA Forum 2013, vol. 13, n. 4, pp 585-588; 
also in relation with its practice and EU proposals at the time MORGAN, C. “The potential on mutual 
recognition as a leading policy principle” and VERMEULEN, G. “How far can we go in applying the 
principle of mutual recognition?”, in C. Fijnaut and J. Ouwerkerk (eds.), The future of police and judicial 
cooperation in the European Union, op. cit., pp. 231-239 and pp. 241-257. Also critical perspective in 
Spain by DE HOYOS SANCHO, M. “El principio de reconocimiento mutuo de resoluciones penales en la 
Unión Europea: ¿asimilación automática o corresponsabilidad?”, Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo 
2005, vol. 9, n. 22, pp. 807-843 and “El principio de reconocimiento mutuo como principio rector de la 
cooperación judicial europea”, in M. Jimeno Bulnes (ed.), La cooperación judicial civil y penal en el ámbito 
de la Unión Europea: instrumentos procesales, Bosch, Barcelona, 2007, pp. 67-90. 
11 
an exception to such EAW execution according to Art. 1 (3) EAW provisions16; this is 
not a simply issue to handle as it has been shown by CJEU case law17. 
 Particularly, EAW presents itself as a juridical and procedural instrument of 
exclusive judicial nature by contrast to an extradition procedure, which entails 
administrative/political and judicial stages. In this context, the EAW supplanted the old 
system of extradition between Member States, whose Conventions18 had in any case not 
been very successful because of the few ratifications produced at the time. The same 
 
16 See specifically FICHERA, M. “EU fundamental rights and the European Arrest Warrant”, in S. Douglas-
Scott & N. Hatzis (eds.), Research handbook on EU Human Rights Law, Edwar Elgar, Cheltenham, pp. 
418-438; also SCHALLMOSER, N.M. “The European Arrest Warrant and fundamental rights. Risks of 
violation of fundamental rights through the EU Framework Decision in light of the ECHR”, European 
Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 2014, vol. 22, n. 2, pp. 135-165. Also at the time 
GARLICK, P. “The European Arrest Warrant and the ECHR”, in R. Blekxtoon and W. van Ballegooij 
(eds.), Handbook on the European Arrest Warrant, TMC Asser Press, The Hague, 2004, pp. 167-182. In 
general on the topic MACKAREL, M. “Human rights as a barrier to surrender”, in N. Keijzer & E. van 
Sliedregt (eds.), The European Arrest Warrant in practice, TMC Asser Press, Amsterdam, 2009, pp. 139-
156.  
17  For example CJEU, 5 April 2016, Aranyosi and Caldararu, C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:198, available at official website form http://curia.europa.eu/juris/recherche; here it takes 
place a preliminary reference by the Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht in Bremen (Higher Regional Court 
of Bremen, Germany) in relation with several EAWs issued by Hungarian and Rumanian authorities against 
both suspect persons, who challenged the detention conditions in their respective countries and, because of 
that, possible violation of Art. 4 CFREU prohibiting inhuman and degrading treatment. The case provoked 
a great discussion in academia, e.g., comments by OUWERKERK, J. “Balancing mutual trust and 
fundamental rights protection in the context of the European Arrest Warrant. What role for the gravity of 
the underlying offence in CJEU case law?”, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal 
Justice 2018, vol. 26, n. 2, pp 103-109; also MARGUERY, T.P. “Towards the end of mutual trust? Prison 
conditions in the context of the European Arrest Warrant and the transfer of prisoners frameworks 
decisions”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 2018, vol. 25, n. 6, pp. 704-717 as well 
as GÁSPÁR-SZILÁGYI, S. “Joined cases Aranyosi and Caldararu: converging human rights standards, 
mutual trust and a new ground for postponing a European Arrest Warrant”, European Journal of Crime, 
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 2016, vol. 24, n. 2-3, pp. 197-216. Also in other countries, eg, 
WILDNER ZAMBIASI, V. and CAVOL KLEE, P.M. “A (possibilidade de) nao execuçao do mandado de 
detençao europeu fundamentada no tratamento ou pena cruel ou degradante”, Revista Brasileira de Direito 
Processual Penal 2018, vol. 4, n. 2, pp. 845-886; in Spain for example BUSTOS GISBERT, R. “¿un 
insuficiente paso en la dirección correcta? Comentario a la sentencia del TJUE (Gran Sala), de 5 de abril 
de 2016, en los casos acumulados Pal Aranyosi (C-404/15) y Robert Caldararu (C-659/15 PPU)”, Revista 
General de Derecho Europeo 2016, n. 40, http://wwwiustel.com and MARTÍN RODRIGUEZ, P.J. “La 
emergencia de los límites constitucionales de la confianza mutua en el espacio de libertad, seguridad y 
justicia en la Sentencia del Tribunal de Justicia Aranyosi y Caldararu”, Revista de Derecho Comunitario 
Europeo 2016, vol. 20, n. 55, pp. 859-900. In general, on the topic BRIBOSIA, E. and WEYEMBERGH, 
A. “Confiance mutuelle et droits fondamentaux: ‘back to the future’”, Cahiers de droit européen, 2016, 
vol. 52, n. 2, pp. 469-521 as well as CLASSEN, H.D. “Schwiriegkeiten eines harmonishen Miteinanders 
von nationalerem und europäischem Grundrechtsschutz”, Europarecht 2017, vol. 52, n. 3, pp. 347-366.  
18 Convention on simplified extradition procedure between the Member States of the European Union, 
signed on 10 March 1995, OJ, n. C 78, 30 March 1995, pp 2-10 and Convention on extradition between 
Member States of European Union, 27 September 1996, OJ, n. C 313, 23 October 1996, pp. 12-23. On the 
evolution to classic mutual assistance model to mutual recognition model see LAGODNY, O. “The 
European Arrest Warrant. Better than a chaos of Conventions?”, in C. Fijnaut and J. Ouwerkerk (eds.), The 
future of police and judicial cooperation in the European Union, op. cit., pp. 335-345 as well as VIDAL 
FERNÁNDEZ, B. “De la ‘asistencia’ judicial penal en Europa a un ‘espacio común de justiciar europeo’”, 
in C. Arangüena Fanego (ed.), Cooperación judicial penal en la Unión Europea: la orden europea de 
detención y entrega, Lex Nova, Valladolid, 2005, pp. 19-73. 
12 
explanatory memorandum of the EAW FWD deems the extradition mechanism obsolete 
and establishes, as an objective of AFSJ, to abolish extradition19 between Member States 
and replace it ‘by a system of surrender between judicial authorities’; explicitly, ‘the 
introduction of a new simplified system of surrender of sentenced or suspected persons 
for the purpose of execution or prosecution of criminal sentences makes it possible to 
remove the complexity and potential for delay inherent in the present extradition 
procedure’ (Recital 5). For this reason, several Member States had already started 
bilateral discussions to prepare treaties of simple surrender of arrested persons to judicial 
authorities, as for example Italy and Spain, and Spain and the United Kingdom20.  
 The EAW popularity as a measure to fight international terrorism fully increased 
because of the deplorable attacks in the United States of America on 11 September 200121. 
Moreover, the proposal of such Council Framework Decision was presented exactly eight 
days after,22 and the political negotiation to reach the necessary agreement among all 
Member States only needed three months23. Its implementation in all Member States 
should be done before 31 December 2003 according to Art. 34 (1) of the EAW FWD and 
further evaluation by EU institutions (Commission and Council) shall also have to take 
place. At the moment, several instruments in support of the EAW’s application by 
 
19 At the time PLACHTA, M. “European Arrest Warrant: revolution in extradition?”, European Journal of 
Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 2003, vol. 11, n. 2, pp. 178-194. Also about the discussion of 
the EAW’s nature LAGODNY, O. “Extradition’ without a granting procedure: the concept of ‘surrender’”, 
in R. Blekxtoon and W. van Ballegooij (eds.), Handbook on the European Arrest Warrant, op. cit., pp. 39-
45 reviewing similarities and differences between extradition and surrender. Nevertheless, still some 
national laws implementing EAW as well as literature nominates extradition to the EAW, e.g., PÉREZ 
CEBADERA, M.A. La nueva extradición europea: la orden de detención y entrega, Tirant lo Blanch, 
Valencia, 2008. 
20 Protocol on Extradition signed in Rome on 28 November 2000 and Bilateral Treaty between Spain and 
UK signed in Madrid on 23 November 2001.  
21 In this context specifically JIMENO-BULNES, M. “After September 11th: the fight against terrorism in 
national and European law. Substantive and procedural rules: some examples”, European Law Journal 
2004, vol. 10, n. 2, pp. 235-253. Also, at the time, WOUTERS, J. and NAERTS, F. “Of arrest warrants, 
terrorist offences and extradition deals. An appraisal of the EU’s main Criminal Law measures against 
terrorism after ‘11th September’”, Common Market Law Review 2004, vol. 41, n. 4, pp. 904-935.    
22 Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures 
between the Member States submitted by the Commission on 19 September 2001, COM 2001 (522) final; 
also published in OJ, n. C 332E, 27 November 2001, pp. 335-319. On the birth of EAW see KEIJZER, N. 
“Origins of the EAW Framework Decision”, in E. Guild and L. Marín (eds.), Still not resolved? 
Constitutional issues of the European Arrest Warrant, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2009, pp. 13-30 
on p. 19 ff. 
23 JHA Council meeting on 6 and 7 December 2001 in Brussels, previous to European Council in Laeken 
on 14 and 15 December 2001. See ALEGRE, S. and LEAF, M. “Mutual recognition in European judicial 
co-operation: a step too far too soon? Case Study- the European Arrest Warrant”, European Law Journal 
2004, vol. 10, n. 4, pp 200-2017, on p. 202.  
13 
national judicial authorities exist, such as a Handbook on EAW 24  elaborated by the 
Council and Commission with the collaboration of several stakeholders including 
Eurojust and the European Judicial Network (EJN), whose websites also provided 
information on the topic25. Indeed, the idea to create a form translated into all the official 
languages of the Member States, which functions as certificate, enormously facilitates the 
task to the involved judicial authorities.  
 
2.2 EAW issuance 
 
 In order to observe the principle of proportionality,26 a minimum punishment 
threshold is required according to Art. 2 (1) EAW, being this different for the purposes 
of an EAW issuance existing prior sentence or not in the issuing Member State; in 
particular, ‘a European arrest warrant may be issued for acts punishable by the law of the 
issuing Member State by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period 
of at least 12 months or, where a sentence has been passed or a detention order has been 
made, for sentences of at least four months’. As specified in the EAW Handbook, 
reference is made exclusively to the maximum possible punishment in the national law 
of the issuing Member State without any consideration to the law of the executing 
Member State according to the principle of mutual recognition; also, consideration of 
these imprisonment’s thresholds takes place with regard to the punishment in abstract. 
 
24 Commission Notice - Handbook on how to issue and execute a European arrest warrant, OJ, n. C 335, 6 
October 2017, pp. 1-83, also available at ULR https://e-
justice.europa.eu/content_european_arrest_warrant-90-en.do (last access on 23 May 2019) with short 
explanation and statistics on EAW practice.   
25 See for example in EJN website https://www.ejn-crimjust.europa.eu/ejn/libcategories.aspx?Id=14 (last 
access on 23 May 2019) including EAW forms as amended by FWD 2009/299/JHA in all official languages 
in pdf and word format as well as practical information in all Member States, e.g., in relation to competent 
judicial authorities in each location; also reports by EU institutions, national legislation on EAW as well as 
case law by CJEU and national courts are provided. About expertise by EU actors see specifically MÉGIE, 
A. “The origin of EU authority in criminal matters: a sociology of legal experts in European policy-
making”, Journal of European Public Policy 2014, vol. 21, n. 2, pp. 230-247. 
26 See specifically on the topic VAN BALLEGOOIJ, W. “The EAW: between the free movement  of 
judicial decisions, proportionality and the rule of law”, in E. Guild and L. Marín (eds.), Still not resolved?..., 
op. cit., pp. 75-95 as well as VOGEL, J. and SPENCER, J.R. “Proportionality and European Arrest 
Warrant”, Criminal Law Review 2010, n. 6, pp. 474-482; also HAGGENMÜLLER, S. “The principle of 
proportionality and the European Arrest Warrant”, Oñati Socio-Legal Series 2013, vol. 3, n. 1, pp. 95-106. 
More recently MANCANO, L. “Mutual recognition in criminal matters, deprivation of liberty and the 
principle of proportionality”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 2018, vol. 25, n. 6, 
pp. 718-732; also JANUARIO, T.F.X. “Do princípio da proporcionalidade e sua aplicaçao no mandado de 
detençao europeu”, Revista Brasileira de Direito Processual Penal 2018, vol. 4, n. 1, pp. 435-472. Last, 
proposing EAW’s substitution, SOTTO MAIOR, M. “The principle of proportionality: alternative 
measures to the European Arrest Warrant”, in N. Keijzer & E. van Sliedregt (eds.), The European Arrest 
Warrant in practice, op. cit., pp. 213-228. 
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Therefore, as said and also mentioned in the EAW Handbook, the principle of 
proportionality must always be observed, taking into account specific circumstances of 
the case27. 
 Nevertheless, the main and most revolutionary feature of the new legal instrument 
is the suppression of the double criminality requirement for a list of 32 crimes with the 
condition imposed by Art. 2 (2) EAW, that is a punishment ‘for a maximum period of at 
least three years’. Initially, this is a numerus clausus list that includes those crimes that 
are supposed to be the most serious ones with a cross-border profile28; in fact, a possible 
extension to other offences or even amendment is contemplated in further Art. 2 (3) EAW 
by Council according to specific proceeding there considered, which at the moment has 
not taken place. The proper exemption of this double criminality principle has also been 
strongly criticized by some literature29 as a kind of violation of the principle nullum crime 
sine lege, but it is one of the most important developments introduced by the EAW 
regulation in comparison with the classical extradition procedures and one of the 
 
27 As proposed in EAW Handbook, following factor can be taken into account: “a) the seriousness of the 
offence (for example, the harm or danger it has caused); b) the likely penalty imposed if the person is found 
guilty of the alleged offence (for example, whether it would be a custodial sentence); c) the likelihood of 
detention of the person in the issuing Member State after surrender; d) the interests of the victims of the 
offence” (p. 14, par. 2.4). Also it is indicated in general terms that “issuing judicial authorities should 
consider whether other judicial cooperation measures could be used instead of issuing an EAW” (p. 15, par. 
2.4).  
28 Particularly, “participation in a criminal organization; terrorism; trafficking in human beings; sexual 
exploitation of children and child pornography; illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances; illicit trafficking in weapons; munitions and explosives; corruption; fraud; laundering of the 
proceeds of crime; counterfeiting currency; including the euro; computer-related crime; environmental 
crime, including illicit trafficking in endangered animal species and in endangered plant species and 
varieties; facilitation of unauthorized entry and residence; murder, grievous bodily injury; illicit trade in 
human organs and tissue; kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-taking; racism and xenophobia; 
organised or armed robbery; illicit trafficking in cultural goods, including antiques and works of art; 
swindling; racketeering and extortion; counterfeiting and piracy of products; forgery of administrative 
documents and trafficking therein; forgery of means of payment; illicit trafficking in hormonal substances 
and other growth promoters; illicit trafficking in nuclear or radioactive materials; trafficking in stolen 
vehicles; rape; arson; crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court; unlawful seizure 
of aircrafts/ships; sabotage”.  
29  See, for example, ALEGRE, S. and LEAF, M., “Mutual recognition in European judicial co-
operation…”, op. cit. on pp. 208-209 in their comment to Art 7 ECHR, double criminality and retrospective 
application.  Also ANDREU-GUZMÁN, F. Terrorism and Human Rights No.2: New challenges and old 
dangers, Occasional papers n.3, International Commission of Jurists, March 2003, on p. 45 ff. See analysis 
of 32 crimes’ list by KEIJZER, N. “The double criminality requirement”, in R. Blekxtoon and W. van 
Ballegooij (eds.), Handbook on the European Arrest Warrant, op. cit., pp 137-163, on p. 152 ff and “The 
fate of the dual incrimination requirement”, in E. Guild and L. Marín (eds.), Still not resolved?..., op. cit., 
pp. 61-75 at p. 69 ff; also VAN SLIEDREGT, E. “The dual criminality requirement”, in N. Keijzer & E. 
van Sliedregt (eds.), The European Arrest Warrant in practice, op. cit., pp. 51-70 as well as BARBE, E. 
“El principio de doble incriminación”, in L. Arroyo Zapatero, A. Nieto Martín (dirs.) and M. Muñoz de 
Morales (ed.), La orden de detención y entrega europea, Ediciones de la Universidad de Castilla-La 
Mancha, Cuenca, 2006, pp. 195-205.  
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outcomes of the mutual reliance on criminal legislation between Member States 30 . 
Furthermore, the objection as to the difficulty of making the legal typification contained 
within the different Member State legislations coincide with regard to the offences 
enumerated in this precept, has been solved by the jurisprudence of some national 
constitutional courts in relation to extradition proceedings31. 
 For the effective transmission of a European arrest warrant, and pursuant to Art. 
6 (1) of the EAW, it shall be assured that both, issuing and executing judicial authorities, 
are competent in their territories to issue/execute the EAW ‘by virtue of the law of that 
State’. 
It means that, by contrast to other topics in the EU32, there is not initially a European 
notion of judicial authority, but this is attached to domestic Law; proof of it are the 
notifications addressed to General Secretariat of the Council ex Art. 6 (3) EAW by 
Member States determining competent judicial authorities in order to issue and execute 
an EAW33. Moreover, designation of central authority takes place in order to assist the 
competent judicial authorities according to Art. 7 EAW, usually the Minister of Justice. 
 
30 That implies the new ‘out of state’ character of principle of criminal legality (nullum crime sine legge et 
nulla poena sine legge). By the way, to be remembered that principle of legality is provided joint with the 
principle of proportionality in Art. 49 CFREU, textually, “no one shall be held guilty of any criminal 
offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national law 
or international law at the time when it was committed” looking more for a temporal than space or 
geographic dimension.  
31 See, for example, in Spain ATC n. 23, 27 January 1997, ECLI: ES: TC: 1997:23A, and STC n. 102, 20 
May 1997, ECLI: ES: TC: 1997:102, both available at https://hj.tribunalconstitucional.es arguing the 
supreme Court that the double criminality principle “does not mind an identity of the criminal rules between 
both states” and “does not require neither the same juridical qualification in both legislations nor an 
identical punishment. The significance of this principle consists of the fact is criminal and has a certain 
punishment in the criminal legislations of requesting state and requested state (Art 2.1 European 
Convention on Extradition)” (ATC 23/1997, FJ 2). In relation to EAW specifically, see literature 
specialized in Criminal Law as SANZ MORÁN, A. “La orden europea de detención y entrega: algunas 
consideraciones de carácter jurídico-material”, in C. Arangüena Fanego (ed.), Cooperación judicial penal 
en la Unión Europea…, op. cit., pp. 75-125, on p. 95 ff and SÁNCHEZ DOMINGO, M.B. “Problemática 
penal de la orden de detención y entrega europea”, in M. Jimeno Bulnes (ed.), Justicia versus seguridad en 
el espacio judicial europeo. Orden de detención europea y garantías procesales, Tirant lo Blanch, 
Valencia, 2011, pp. 61-107, on p. 85 ff. 
32 In concrete, promotion of preliminary ruling according to CJEU case law, which first example was 
Vaasen-Göbbels judgment on June 30th, 1966, 61/65, ECLI:EU:C:1966:39; here the reference proposed by 
the Scheidsgerecht van het Beambtenfonds voor het Mijnbedrijf Heerlen  was ‘considered a court or tribunal 
within the meaning of Article 177’ and ‘therefore the request for interpretation was admissible’ although it 
was not considered an ordinary court of law under Dutch law. See in favor of such European concept of 
judicial body JIMENO BULNES, M. La cuestión prejudicial del artículo 177 TCE, Bosch, Barcelona, 
1996, on p. 184 ff; also specifically SOCA TORRES, I. La cuestión prejudicial europea. Planteamiento y 
competencia del Tribunal de Justicia, Bosch, Barcelona, 2016, on p. 122 ff in relation to Vaasen-Göbbels. 
33  All of them contained in prior EJN website in relation to EAW at https://www.ejn-
crimjust.europa.eu/ejn/libcategories.aspx?Id=14 (last access on 23 May 2019). These judicial authorities 
can be not only judges but also public prosecutor and even police in some countries, e.g., Sweden where 
the National Police Board (Rikspolisstyrelssen ) can be issuing judicial authority when the purpose of a 
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 As for the form in which to issue a European arrest warrant, the European rule 
provides an annex including same concepts numerated in Art. 8 of the EAW,34 and the 
EAW Handbook includes specific guidelines on how to fill the EAW form (Annex III). 
Furthermore, the translation ‘into the official language or one of the official languages of 
the executing Member State’ is requested, according to Art. 8 (2) of the EAW; each 
country chooses which language shall be required, usually the official one/s and an 
additional common one, usually English35. With regard to the transmission procedure of 
the EAW, the rule makes a substantial difference if the location of the requested person 
is known or unknown; in this last case there is the possibility for the judicial authority to 
issue an alert for the requested person in the Schengen Information System or SIS36 ex 
Art. 9 of the EAW. Nevertheless, and in practice, SIS is extensively employed in most of 
the Member States37 even when the location of the requested person is known, something 
that is not prohibited according to Art. 9 (2) of the EAW. 
 Finally, Art. 18 of the EAW FWD also regulates the possibility for the issuing 
judicial authority to ask for ‘temporary surrenders’ while a procedure of definitive 
 
EAW is to enforce ‘a custodial sentence or other form of detention’ according to cover note received on 
April 3rd, 2009, COPEN 101, EJN 31, EUROJUST 33.  
34 Textually, “a) the identity and nationality of the requested person; b) the name, address, telephone and 
fax numbers and e-mail address of the issuing judicial authority; c) evidence of an enforceable judgment, 
an arrest warrant or any other enforceable judicial decision having the same effect; d) the nature and legal 
classification of the offence; e) a description of the circumstances in which the offence was committed 
including the time, place and degree of participation in the offence by the requested person; f) the penalty 
imposed, if there is a final judgment or the prescribed scale of penalties for the offence under the law of the 
issuing Member State; g) if possible, other consequences of the offence”. Besides EAW Handbook prior 
mentioned see in literature GINTER, J. “The content of a European Arrest Warrant”, in N. Keijzer & E. 
van Sliedregt (eds.), The European Arrest Warrant in practice, op. cit., pp. 1-17.  
35 Such information usually is included in prior notifications or notes, eg, according to prior Swedish cover 
note “Sweden will accept a European arrest warrant written in Swedish, Danish, Norwegian or English” (p. 
4).  
36 According to Art. 26 Council Decision 2007/533/JHA of 12 June 2007 on the establishment, operation 
and use of the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II), OJ n. L 205, 7 August 2007, pp. 
63-84, which explicitly contemplates that “data on persons wanted for arrest for surrender purposes on the 
basis of a European Arrest Warrant or wanted for arrest for extradition shall be entered at the request of the 
judicial authority of the issuing Member State”. Definition of alert is included in Art. 3 (1) (a) SIS II as “set 
of data entered in SIS II allowing the competent judicial authorities to identify a person or an object with a 
view to taking specific action”. In this case transmission takes place through national SIRENE Bureau as 
indicated in EAW Handbook. See at the time with prior regulation JIMENO BULNES, M. “Las nuevas 
tecnologías en el ámbito de la cooperación judicial y policial europea”, Revista de Estudios Europeos, 2002, 
n. 31, pp. 97-124, on p. 117 ff and more specifically DE FRUTOS, J.L.M. “Transmisión de la euroorden. 
Aspectos policiales desde una perspectiva práctica”, in L. Arroyo Zapatero, A. Nieto Martín (dirs.) and M. 
Muñoz de Morales (ed.), La orden de detención y entrega europea, op. cit., pp. 175-185.  
37 With the only exception of Ireland and Cyprus according to information provided in EAW Handbook at 
p. 22 (par. 3.3.3); in these countries the EAW is sent either directly or through Interpol National Office, 
which is provided according to Art. 10 (3) EAW. This is known as “red notice alert”; see on the topic 
KÜHNE, H.H. “Der mangelhafte Rechtschutz gegen einen internationalen Hftbefehl”, Europarecht 2018, 
vol. 165, n. 3, pp. 121-126.  
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surrender is being carried forward in the executing Member State, or even a national 
criminal proceeding in order ‘to avoid lengthy delays’38. According to Art. 18 (2) of the 
EAW, ‘the conditions and the duration of the temporary transfer shall be determined by 
mutual agreement between the issuing and executing judicial authorities’; the EAW 
Handbook recommends to express such agreement ‘by writing and in clear terms’. Also, 
a provision establishing the possibility for the transferred person ‘to return to the 
executing Member State to attend hearings concerning him or her as part of the surrender 
procedure’ is also included in Art. 18 (3) of the EAW. In fact, such temporary surrenders 
could be substituted by the possibility of using another kind of resource instead, such as 
a videoconference initially provided in the first draft of the EAW Framework Decision39 
as well as in other European and national texts; particularly, such measure is now 
specifically contemplated in the European Investigation Order40.  
2.3 EAW execution 
    
 According to the general rule provided in Art. 1 (2) of the  EAW and confirmed 
by CJEU case law,41 ‘Member States shall execute any European arrest warrant on the 
 
38 EAW Handbook, cit., p. 36, par. 5.9.3. On temporary urrenders see specifically DELGADO MARTÍN, 
J. “Entregas temporales”, in L. Arroyo Zapatero, A. Nieto Martín (dirs.) y M. Muñoz de Morales (ed.), La 
orden de detención y entrega europea, op. cit., pp. 431-451. 
39 Art 34 Proposal EAW Framework Decision, cit.  
40 Art. 24 (1) Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 
regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal matters, OJ, n. L 130, 1 May 2014, pp. 1-36 
replacing prior Art. 10 (9) Convention on mutual assistance in criminal matters established by Council Act 
of 29 May 2000, OJ, n. C 197, 12 July 2000, pp. 1-23. See specifically on this topic VALBUENA 
GONZÁLEZ, F. “La intervención a distancia de sujetos en el proceso penal”, Revista del Poder Judicial 
2007, n. 85, pp. 545-565 and “Una perspectiva de Derecho Comparado en la Unión Europea acerca de la 
utilización de la videoconferencia en el proceso penal: los ordenamientos español, italiano y francés”, 
Revista de Estudios Europeos 2009, n. 53, pp. 117-127.  
41 See recent case LM (also known as Celmer), 25 July 2018, C-216/18, ECLI:EU:C:2015:586, where is 
pointed that, “while execution of the European arrest warrant constitutes the rule, refusal to execute is 
intended to be an exception which must be interpreted strictly (see to that effect, judgement of 10 August 
2017, Tupikas C-270/17 PPU, EU:C:2017:628, paragraphs 49 and 50 and the case law cited)” (par. 41). 
Here the CJEU answers the request for a preliminary ruling promoted by the High Court of Ireland 
challenging the execution of several EAWs issued by Poland on the basis of Art. 1 (3) EAW due to the 
impact of legislative changes related to the judiciary in this country and the possible breach of the 
fundamental right to a fair trial guaranteed by Art. 47 (2) CFREU. The case has caused great discussion in 
literature like prior Aranyosi and Caldararu case due to the breach of mutual trust between Member States 
on the basis of such possible violation of fundamental rights; see recent comments on consequences by 
WENDEL, M. “Mutual trust, essence and federalism – Between consolidating and fragmenting the Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice”, European Constitutional Review 2019, vol. 15, n. 1, pp. 17-47. Also 
about same discussion DE AMICIS, G. “Esecuzione del mandato di arresto europeo e tutela dei diritti 
fondamentali in presenza di gravi carenze nel sistema giudiziario dello stato di emmissione: Corte di 
Giustizia dell’Unione Europea, Grande Sezione, 25 luglio 2018, C-216/18”, Cassazione Penale 2018, vol. 
58, n. 11, pp 3907-3913 and VERHEYEN, L. “The principle of mutual trust between the Member States in 
the context of an European Arrest Warrant at risk again? – the case of M. Artur Celmer (LM)”, available at 
https://www.academia.edu/37996015/THE_PRINCIPLE_OF_MUTUAL_TRUST_BETWEEN_THE_M
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basis of the principle of mutual recognition and in accordance with the provisions of this 
Framework Decision’. As stated, this is the general rule but also exceptions to this one 
are contemplated in the same EAW regulation as Art. 1 (3) of the EAW provision which 
requires the ‘obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as 
enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union’, which has been argued in 
relevant CJEU case law as in the mentioned Aranyosi and Caldararu and Celmer cases. 
In both of them, the CJEU understood that refusal to execute an EAW should be an 
exception to be strictly interpreted requiring the executing judicial authority to ask for 
supplementary information to the issuing judicial authority in order to determine 
‘specifically and precisely’ if there is a real risk of breach of fundamental rights of the 
concerned individual, in which case a postponement of the EAW execution should take 
place42; nevertheless this decision must consider personal circumstances of concerned 
individuals in a case-by-case basis and not argued in a general context accordingly43.  
 
EMBER_STATES_IN_THE_CONTEXT_OF_A_EUROPEAN_ARREST_WARRANT_AT_RISK_AG
AIN_The_case_of_Mr._Artur_Celmer_LM_ (last access on 25 May 2019).  
42 In concrete, the CJEU ruled in Aranyosi and Caldararu that “Article 1(3), Article 5 and Article 6(1) of 
Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the 
surrender procedures between Member States must be interpreted as meaning that, where there is objective, 
reliable, specific and properly updated evidence with respect to detention conditions in the issuing Member 
State that demonstrates that there are deficiencies, which may be systemic or generalized, or which may 
affect certain groups of people, or which may affect certain places of detention, the executing judicial 
authority must determine, specifically and precisely, whether there are substantial grounds to believe that 
the individual concerned by a European arrest warrant, issued for the purposes of conducting a criminal 
prosecution or executing a custodial sentence, will be exposed, because of the conditions for his detention 
in the issuing Member State, to a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment, within the meaning of Article 
4 of the Charter, in the event of his surrender to that Member State. To that end, the executing judicial 
authority must request that supplementary information to be provided by the issuing judicial authority, 
which, after seeking, if necessary, the assistance of the central authority or one of the central authorities of 
the issuing Member State, under Article 7 of the Framework Decision, must send that information within 
the time limit specified in the request. The executing judicial authority must postpone its decision on the 
surrender of the individual concerned until it obtains the supplementary information that allows it to 
discount the existence of such a risk. If the existence of that risk cannot be discounted within a reasonable 
time, the executing judicial authority must decide whether the surrender procedure should be brought to an 
end.” Such case law is also introduced in the EAW Handbook providing concrete guidelines in relation to 
fundamental rights considerations on p. 33 ff (par. 5.6); in sum, some procedural steps are numerated to 
guide the executing judicial authority in order to verify the risk of violation of fundamental rights if the 
requested person is surrendered.  
43 As it was ruled in Celmer case by CEU, “Article 1(3) of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 
13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States… must 
be interpreted as meaning that, where the executing judicial authority, called upon to decide whether a 
person in respect of whom a European arrest warrant has been issued for the purposes of conducting a 
criminal prosecution is to be surrendered, has material, such as that set out in a reasoned proposal of the 
European Commission adopted pursuant to Article 7(1) TEU, indicating that there is a real risk of breach 
of the fundamental right to a fair trial guaranteed by the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, on account of systemic or generalized deficiencies so far as 
concerns the independence of the issuing Member State’s judiciary, that authority must determine, 
specifically and precisely, whether, having regard to his personal situation, as well as to the nature of the 
offence for which he is being prosecuted and the factual context that form the basis of the European arrest 
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 The EAW rule likewise regulates specific grounds for non-execution in a double 
category classification, as it is mandatory and of optional nature. The first ones are 
numerated in Art. 3 EAW and are the same in all Member States as a consequence of such 
compulsory nature; they contemplate, specifically and briefly, ‘if the offence on which 
the arrest warrant is based is covered by amnesty in the executing Member State’, ‘if the 
executing judicial authority is informed that the requested person has been finally judged 
by a Member State in respect of the same acts provided’ (ne/non bis in idem )44 and ‘if 
the person who is subject of the European arrest warrant may not, owing to his age, be 
held criminally responsible for the acts on which the arrest warrant is based under the law 
of the executing State’. The second ones are compiled in a broader list, and are differently 
implemented by the Member States as a consequence of its facultative nature45.  
 Art. 2 Council FWD 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009 added a new Art. 4a 
EAW contemplating an additional optional ground for the refusal of a EAW by an 
 
warrant, and in the light of the information provided by the issuing Member State pursuant to Article 15(2) 
of Framework Decision 2002/584, as amended, there are substantial grounds for believing that that person 
will run such a risk if he is surrendered to that State”. 
44 “Where there has been sentence, the sentence has been served or is currently being served or may no 
longer be executed under the law of the sentencing Member State”, otherwise it will fall under the following 
grounds for optional non-execution of the EAW according to Art. 4 EAW. See on the topic VAN DER 
WILT, H. “The European Arrest Warrant and the principle ne bis in idem”, in R. Blekxtoon and W. van 
Ballegooij (eds.), Handbook on the European Arrest Warrant, op. cit., pp. 99-117 as well as CIMAMONTI. 
S. “European Arrest Warrant in practice and ne bis in ídem “, in N. Keijzer & E. van Sliedregt (eds.), The 
European Arrest Warrant in practice, op. cit., pp 111-129; also in Spain DE HOYOS SANCHO, M. 
“Eficacia transnacional del non bis in ídem y denegación de la euroorden”, Diario La Ley 2005, n. 6330, 
pp. 1-6 and JIMENO BULNES, M. “El principio de non bis in idem en la orden de detención europea: 
régimen legal y tratamiento jurisprudencial”, in A. de la Oliva Santos (dir.), M. Aguilera Morales and I. 
Cubillo López (eds.), La justicia y la Carta de Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea, Colex, 
Madrid, 2008, pp. 275-294. In general on the grounds for refusal, DE HOYOS SANCHO, M. “Euro-orden 
y causas de denegación de la entrega”, in C. Arangüena Fanego (ed.), Cooperación judicial penal en la 
Unión Europea, op. cit., pp. 207-312 as well as, specifically, EAW Handbook on p. 29 ff (par. 5.4 ff). 
45 Literally and briefly, “1. If, in one of the cases referred to Article 2 (4), the act on which the European 
arrest warrant is based does not constitute an offence under the law of the executing Member State; 2. 
Where the person who is the subject of the European arrest warrant is being prosecuted in the executing 
Member State for the same act as that on which the European arrest warrant is based; 3. Where the judicial 
authorities of the executing Member State have decided either not to prosecute for the offence on which the 
European arrest warrant is based or to halt proceedings…; 4. Where the criminal prosecution or punishment 
of the requested person is statute-barred according to the law of the executing Member State and the acts 
fall within the jurisdiction of that Member State under its own criminal law; 5. If the executing judicial 
authority is informed that the requested person has been finally judged by a third State in respect of the 
same acts…; 6. If the European arrest warrant has been issued for the purposes of execution of a custodial 
sentence or detention order, where the requested person is staying in, or is a national or a resident of the 
executing Member State and that State undertakes to execute the sentence or detention order in accordance 
with its domestic law; 7. Where the European arrest warrant relates to offences which: a) are regarded by 
the law of the executing Member State as having been committed in whole or in part in the territory of the 
executing Member State or in a place treated as such; or b) have been committed outside the territory of the 
issuing Member State and the law of the executing Member State does not allow prosecution for the same 
offences when committed outside its territory”. 
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executing judicial authority ‘if the person did not appear in person at the trial resulting in 
the decision’ unless the European arrest warrant states the fulfilment of any of following 
requirements in favour of the requested person: ‘a) either was summoned in person… or 
by other means… received official information of the scheduled date and place of that 
trial… and was informed that a decision may be handed down if he or she does not appear; 
or, b) being aware of the scheduled trial, had given a mandate to a legal counsellor, who 
was either appointed by the person concerned or by the State, to defend him or her at the 
trial’; or ‘c) after being served with the decision and being expressly informed about the 
rights of a retrial, or an appeal … i) expressly stated that he or she does not contest the 
decision; or ii) did not request a retrial or appeal..; or d) was not personally served with 
the decision but: i) will personally be served with it without delay after the surrender and 
will be expressly informed of his or her right to a retrial, o an appeal… and ii) will be 
informed of the time frame within which he or she has to request such a retrial or appeal’. 
This amendment on the EAW is aimed at solving prior problems with the EAWs issued 
on the basis of judgments rendered in absentia, although, as stated in the Preamble, its 
aim is not to prohibit execution of such EAW but to guarantee the observance of the 
requested person’s defence rights46.  
 In fact, prior ground for refusal was included till then as specific guarantee and/or 
condition to be given by the issuing Member State, in particular cases in Art. 5 of the 
EAW together with the following ones: the review of the penalty or measure imposed in 
the case that the EAW is based on a custodial life sentence or a life-time detention order 
as well as the returning of the requested person to the executing Member State in order to 
serve there the custodial sentence or detention order if he or she is a national or resident 
of the executing Member State; here it must be remembered that the EAW, by contrast to 
the classic extradition affects both nationals and residents of the executing Member 
 
46 According to Recital 4 FWD 2009/299/JHA “it is therefore necessary to provide clear and common 
grounds for non-recognition of decisions rendered following a trial at which the person concerned did not 
appear in person. This Framework Decision is aimed at refining the definition of such common grounds 
allowing the executing authority to execute this decision despite the absence of the person at the trial, while 
fully respecting the person’s right of defence”. See on the topic with comments to specific cases carried out 
by Fair Trials International organisation MANSELL, D. “The European Arrest Warrant and defence rights”, 
European Criminal Law Review 2012, vol. 2, n. 1, pp. 36-46. Also generally KRAPAC, D. “Verdicts in 
absentia “, in R. Blekxtoon and W. van Ballegooij (eds.), Handbook on the European Arrest Warrant, op. 
cit., pp. 119-135 as well as RODRIGUEZ SOL, L. “Sentencia dictada en rebeldía”, in L. Arroyo Zapatero, 
A. Nieto Martín (dirs.) and M. Muñoz de Morales (ed.), La orden de detención y entrega europea, op. cit., 
pp. 283-294. 
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States47. The new provision has already given place to relevant CJEU case law such as 
Melloni48 , resulting from a preliminary reference promoted for the first time by the 
Spanish Constitutional Court and on which Luxembourg made a strict interpretation of 
the new optional ground for EAW refusal, because of that it was  criticized in academia49; 
particularly the Court of Justice ruled the prohibition for the executing judicial authority 
‘to make the surrender of a person convicted in absentia  conditional upon to conviction 
being open to review in the issuing Member State’, considering that no violation of Arts. 
47, 48 and 53 of the CFREU takes place because of that. 
 
2.4 Surrender procedure 
  
 
47 See on the topic LENSING, H. “The European Arrest Warrant and transferring execution of prison 
sentences”, in R. Blekxtoon and W. van Ballegooij (eds.), Handbook on the European Arrest Warrant, op. 
cit., pp. 209-216 as well as GLERUM, V. and ROZEMOND, K. “Surrender of nationals”, in N. Keijzer & 
E. van Sliedregt (eds.), The European Arrest Warrant in practice, op. cit., pp. 71-87; also FLORÉ, D. “La 
entrega de nacionales del Estado miembro de ejecución de la orden de detención”, en L. Arroyo Zapatero, 
A. Nieto Martín (dirs.) and M. Muñoz de Morales (ed.), La orden de detención y entrega europea, op. cit., 
pp. 207-227. In relation with this last issue and some of the prior ones see DE AMICIS, G. “Initial views 
of the Court of Justice on the European Arrest Warrant: towards a uniform Pan-European interpretation?”, 
European Criminal Law Review 2012, vol. 2, n. 1, pp. 47-60. 
48 Judgement of 26 February 2013, C-399/11 in relation with EAW issued by the Tribunale di Ferrara 
(District court, Ferrara, Italy) to be executed by Audiencia Nacional (Criminal Division of the High Court, 
Spain) against Stefano Melloni, who was sentenced in absentia to 10 years imprisonment for bankruptcy 
fraud. He filed in Spain a defence appeal (recurso de amparo ) before the Spanish Constitutional Court 
(Tribunal Constitucional ), who referred the respective preliminary ruling before the CJEU; interesting to 
point as said it was the first time that the Spanish Constitutional Court promoted a preliminary reference. 
See especially BACHMAIER WINTER, L. “Dealing with European Legal diversity and the Luxembourg 
Court: Melloni and the limits of European pluralism”, in R. Colson and S. Field (eds.), EU Criminal Justice 
and the challenge of diversity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2016, pp. 160-178 and “Más 
reflexiones sobre la sentencia Melloni: primacía, diálogo y protección de los derechos fundamentals en 
juicios in absentia en el Derecho europeo”, Civitas. Revista Española de Derecho europeo 2015, n. 56, pp. 
153-180; also same author “Diálogo entre tribunales cinco años después de Melloni. Reacciones a nivel 
nacional”, Revista General de Derecho Europeo 2018, n. 15, http://www.iustel.com, analyzing further 
consequences of Melloni case especially in Spain.  
49 See TINSLEY, A. “Note on the reference in case C-399/11 Melloni”, New Journal of European Criminal 
Law 2012, vol. 3, n. 1, pp. 19-30, who concludes that “the reference evokes a more fundamental problem 
with the area of freedom, security and justice: that wherever cooperation and fundamental rights standards 
conflict, the lowest common denominator (the ECHR) prevails” (p. 30). Also, for example, criticism by 
DUBOUT, E. “Le niveau de protection des droits fondamentaux dans l’Union européenne: unitarisme 
constitutive versus pluraisme constitutionnel – Réflexions autour de l’arrêt Melloni”, Cahiers de droit 
européen 2013, vol. 49, n. 2, pp. 293-317 as well as PLIAKOS, A. and ANAGNOSTARAS, G. 
“Fundamental rights and the new battle over legal and judicial supremacy: lessons from Melloni”, Yearbook 
of European Law 2015, vol. 34, n. 1, pp. 97-126. In contrast, GARCÍA SÁNCHEZ, B. “TJUE – Sentencia 
de 26.03.2013, C-399/11- Cooperación policial y judicial en materia penal – Orden de detención europea – 
Procedimientos de entrega entre Estados miembros – Resoluciones dictadas a raíz de un juicio en que el 
interesado no ha comparecido – Ejecución de una pena impuesta en rebeldía – Posibilidad de revisión de la 
sentencia. ¿Homogeneidad o standard mínimo de protección de los derechos fundamentales en la euroorden 
europea?”, Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo 2013, vol. 17, n. 46, pp. 1137-1156, considering that 
the CJEU does not establish mínimum standards but “homogeneous rules on fundamental rights” (p. 1152). 
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 The following rules included in the EAW deal with the concrete surrender 
procedure to be carried out by the executing judicial authority. As specified in Art. 11 of 
the EAW, the first aspect to bear in mind to proceed is the arrest of the requested person 
as a sort of preventive measure of personal character50, which usually takes place in 
national criminal proceedings but in this case is attached to the European context; such 
arrest, as a provisional measure with interim character, must give later place to other 
preventive measure, either preventive detention/custody or provisional release according 
to national law (Art. 12 of the EAW). For the same reason, this provision also 
contemplates common procedural rights 51  established in national rules for such 
preventive measures and national criminal proceedings in general, as the right to a legal 
counsel and interpreter if necessary, both part of the right of defence; the right to 
information of the EAW’s content as well as of the right to consent to surrender52. In all 
cases, the remission to national rules is done and currently it must be companied with the 
reference to appropriate Directives on procedural rights of suspects in criminal 
proceedings later analysed53. 
 An important rule is enshrined in Art. 13 EAW in relation with the prior consent 
to surrender by the requested person joint, ‘if appropriate’ to the ‘renunciation of the 
entitlement to the ‘specialty rule’’, which must be expressed before the executing judicial 
authority, again, according to national rules. The specialty rule is regulated in further Art. 
27 EAW requiring specific notification by Member States54 if the requested person may 
or ‘may not be prosecuted, sentenced or otherwise deprived of his or her liberty for an 
offence committed prior to his or her surrender other than that for which he or she was 
 
50 See specifically JIMENO BULNES, M. “Medidas cautelares de carácter personal”, in Arroyo Zapatero, 
Nieto Martín and Muñoz de Morales, La orden de detención y entrega europea, op. cit., pp. 363-382 and 
“La adopción de medidas cautelares de carácter personal con motivo de la ejecución de una orden europea 
de detención y entrega”, Revista Penal 2005, n. 16, pp. 106-122. Also ARANGÜENA FANEGO, C. “Las 
medidas cautelares en el procedimiento de euro-orden”, en C. Arangüena Fanego (ed.), Cooperación 
judicial penal en la Unión Europea…, op. cit., pp. 127-205.  
51 See specifically MORGAN, C. “The European Arrest Warrant and defendants’ rights: an overview”, in 
R. Blekxtoon and W. van Ballegooij, Handbook on the European Arrrest Warrant, op. cit., pp. 195-216. 
Also BERNARD, D. “El derecho fundamental a ser informado acerca del contenido de la orden de 
detención y entrega europea” and JIMÉNEZ-VILLAREJO FERNÁNDEZ, F. “El derecho fundamental a 
ser asistido por abogado e intérprete”, in L. Arroyo Zapatero, A. Nieto Martín (dirs.) and M. Muñoz de 
Morales (ed.), La orden de detención y entrega europea, op. cit., pp. 319-324 and pp. 325-354. 
52 In this sense JIMENO BULNES, M. “Medidas cautelares de carácter personal”, op. cit., on p. 372 ff. 
Also specifically in the same book ARANGÜENA FANEGO, C. “Las medidas cautelares en regulación de 
la orden de detención y entrega: especial consideración de la prisión provisional y sus alternativas y de la 
intervención de objetos y efectos del delito”, pp. 383-429. 
53 See also EAW Handbook on p. 42 ff (par. 11).  
54  See specifically countries notifications at EJN website https://www.ejn-
crimjust.europa.eu/ejn/libcategories.aspx?Id=14 (last access on 26 May 2016).  
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surrendered’ (Art. 27 (2) EAW)55; also, exceptions and conditions for the application of 
such specialty rule are foreseen in this same precept, i.e., the fulfilment of the EAW 
requirements also in relation to the prior offence. Consent and renunciation can be 
revoked if it is explicitly provided by the Member State in question and in accordance to 
its national rules.  
 As a matter of fact, the same consent determines the further proceeding to deal 
under the EAW execution as well as time limits in surrender of the requested person. 
Specifically, Art. 14 of the EAW points that ‘where the arrested person does not consent 
to his or her surrender… he or she shall be entitled to be heard by the executing judicial 
authority, in accordance with the law of the executing Member States’; the same right to 
be heard by the requested person is guaranteed in further Art. 19 of the EAW56. Usually, 
according to national implementation on EAW in each Member State, a hearing shall take 
place before the executing judicial authority observes specific procedural rules in the 
domestic criminal proceeding, especially those concerned to the protection of the right of 
the defence of the requested person57. Moreover, as anticipated, the time limits of the 
surrender decision are different according to the existence or nonexistence of consent to 
 
55 See comments by LAGODNY, O. and ROSBAUD, C. “Specialty rule”, in N. Keijzer & E. van Sliedregt 
(eds.), The European Arrest Warrant in practice, op. cit., pp. 265-295 at pp. 273 ff; also MUÑOZ CUESTA, 
F.J. “Orden europea de detención y entrega: el principio de especialidad y el derecho de defensa”, Revista 
Aranzadi Doctrinal, 2013, n. 5, pp. 41-50. In general to consent and specialty rule DE PRADA SOLAESA, 
J.R. “Consentimiento a la entrega. Renuncia al principio de especialidad”, in L. Arroyo Zapatero, A. Nieto 
Martín (dirs.) and M. Muñoz de Morales (ed.), La orden de detención y entrega europea, op. cit., pp. 355-
359. Also interpretation by CJEU case law has been provided, eg, 1 December 2008, Leymann and 
Pustovarov, C-388/08 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2008:669. 
56 Textually, “1. The requested person shall be heard by a judicial authority, assisted by another person 
designated in accordance with the law of the Member State of the requesting court. 2. The requested person 
shall be heard in accordance with the law of the executing Member State and with the conditions determined 
by mutual agreement between the issuing and executing judicial authorities. 3. The competent executing 
judicial authority may assign another judicial authority of its Member State to take part in the hearing of 
the requested person in order to ensure the proper application of this Article and of the conditions laid 
down.” In fact, this whole article has been qualified since the enactment of the EAW as a ‘riddle’ because 
of the vagueness of its content, especially one referring to the first provision and the person nominated 
according to the issuing state without mentioning its character (judge, public prosecutor, court clerk, 
lawyer…); see comments on this article by BLEXTOON, R. “Commentary on an article by article basis”, 
in R. Blekxtoon and W. van Ballegooij (eds.), Handbook on the European Arrest Warrant, op. cit., pp. 217-
269, on p.256.  
57 For example, in Spain Art. 51 (1) Act 23/2014, of 20 November, on mutual recognition of judicial 
decisions in criminal matters in the European Union, which textually indicates: “Hearing the person arrested 
shall take place with the maximum term of seventy-two hours from him being handed over, attended by the 
Public Prosecutor, by the legal counsel to the arrested person and, when appropriate, in interpreter, and 
must be performed pursuant to the provisions foreseen for detainees to declare under the Criminal 
Procedure Act. The right of defence shall also be guaranteed and, where legally appropriate, free legal aid 
shall be provided”. English version of this and other Spanish legislation is provided at official Ministry of 
Justice website https://www.mjusticia.gob.es/cs/Satellite/Portal/es/servicios-ciudadano/documentacion-
publicaciones/publicaciones/traducciones-derecho-espanol (last access on 26 May 2019).  
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the surrender by the arrested person, whose provision is contained in Art. 17 of the EAW. 
First, if there is consent, the surrender decision will be adopted by the executing judicial 
authority in a time limit of ten days after the hearing; second, if there is not consent to the 
surrender, the surrender decision extends to a time limit of sixty days from the issuance 
of the arrest warrant (Article 19.3). In both cases, time limits may be extended by a further 
thirty days period if reasonable grounds are presented. 
 Finally58, the definitive surrender will be done by the executing Member State to 
the specific authority designated by the issuing judicial authority, being the place and date 
of such surrender previously indicated, in any case no later than ten days after the final 
decision on the execution of the European arrest warrant according to Art. 23 (2) of the 
EAW. Nevertheless, there is a possibility to arrange a new surrender date between both 
judicial authorities as well as the exceptional and provisional postponement of the 
surrender due to serious humanitarian reasons59 and the obligation to release the arrested 
person upon expiry of the time limits. But although short time limits to proceed to the 
surrender are legally provided, surprisingly, in the case of non-fulfilment, no kind of 
juridical sanction or penalties are contemplated; according to Art. 17 (7) EAW, only the 
information to Eurojust is required ‘giving the reasons for the delay’, besides the 
information supplied to the Council by the Member State ‘which has experienced 
repeated delays on the part of another Member State in the execution of European arrest 
warrants’.  
 
2.5 CJEU case law and statistics  
 
 
58 Others legal provisions contemplate different issues such as privileges and immunities (Art. 20 EAW), 
postponed or conditional surrenders (Art. 24 EAW), transit (Art. 25 EAW), deduction of the period of 
detention served in the executing Member State (art. 28 EAW), handing over of property (Art. 29 EAW), 
concurrence of surrender and/or extradition requests (Art. 28 EAW). See prior literature on each topic.  
59  “For example if there are substantial grounds for believing that it would manifestly endanger the 
requested person’s life or health’ with the condition that “the execution of the European arrest warrant shall 
take place as soon as these grounds have ceased to exist” according to Art. 23 (4) EAW. In the case that 
such humanitarian reasons are “indefinite or permanent” the EAW Handbook recommends consultation 
between both issuing and executing judicial authorities in order to discuss the possibility to employ 
alternative measures to EAW “for example, possibilities to transfer proceedings or the custodial sentence 
to the executing Member State or to withdraw the EAW”, especially in the case of serious permanent illness; 
see EAW Handbook on p. 35 (par. 5.9.1.). Also, in literature about this topic PANZAVOLTA, M. 
“Humanitarian concerns within the EAW system”, in N. Keijzer & E. van Sliedregt (eds.), The European 
Arrest Warrant in practice, op. cit., pp. 179-212, on p. 197 ff.  
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 Currently, there is extensive case law in relation with the EAW provided by the 
CJEU since the first judgment on 3 May 2007, Advocaten voor de Wereld60, untile the 
last one at the time of writing this paper, just yesterday, all of them available on the EJN 
website61 together with the pending cases, although some delay in the updating of the 
website has been observed. Topics have been very different in all these judgments on 
EAW interpreting several provisions contained in the EAW FWD, some of them very 
controversial in national context as previously mentioned, e.g., Melloni. The case law 
deals with several questions related to the application of general procedural principles as 
in absentia and non bis idem, principles of legality and non-discrimination, specialty rule, 
time-limits, fundamental rights, judicial authority and other specific questions as  shown 
in the specific report elaborated by Eurojust and posted in the above- mentioned 
website62.  
 Particularly in relation with this last issue, the most recent judgment up to now is 
PI (Parquet de Zwickau), was delivered on 27 May 201963. On this occasion, the Court 
of Justice interprets the concept of ‘issuing judicial authority’ differentiating the public 
prosecutor’s offices in Germany, who cannot issue an EAW as far as they are not 
independent authorities and the Prosecutor General of Lithuania, who, by contrast, must 
be considered an issuing judicial authority according to the EAW provisions as 
institutionally independent of the judiciary. The argument employed for the denial of such 
character in the first case is that the public prosecutor in Germany is ‘exposed to the risk 
of being subject, directly or indirectly, to directions or instructions in a specific case from 
 
60 C-303/2005, ECLI:EU:C:2007/261 resulting of preliminary reference promoted by the Arbitragehof 
(Belgium) in relation with nature of FWD EAW as well as the double criminality requirement ruling the 
Court of Justice that “examination of the questions submitted has revealed no factor capable of affecting 
the validity of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant 
and the surrender procedures between Member States”. See for example comments by CLOOTS, E. “Germs 
of pluralist judicial adjudication: Advocaten voor Wereld and other references from the Belgian 
Constitutional Court”, Common Market Law Review 2010, vol. 47, n. 3, pp. 645-672; also HERLIN-
KARNELL, E. “In the wake of Pupino: Advocaaten voor der Wereld and Dell’Orto”, German Law 
Journal, 2007, vol. 8, n. 12, pp. 1147-1160, on p. 1153 ff. 
61 ULR https://www.ejn-crimjust.europa.eu/ejn/libcategories.aspx?Id=14 (last Access on 28 May 2019) 
including 26 cases on EAW at the moment. In relation with recent CJEU case law see for example 
SATZGER, H. “Mutual recognition in times of crisis. Mutual recognition in crisis? An analysis of the new 
jurisprudence on the European Arrest Warrant”, European Criminal Law Review 2018, n. 3, pp. 317-331.  
62  ‘CJEU Case Law Overviews’, January 2017, available at https://www.ejn-
crimjust.europa.eu/ejn/libdocumentproperties.aspx?Id=2063 (last access on 28 May 2019), providing an 
overview by CJEU with regard to the application of EAW according to different topics summarized as 
keywords in index. 
63  CJEU, 27 May 2019, C-508/18 and C-82/19 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2019:456, available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=214466&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&
mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2136689  (last access on 28 May 2019).  
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the executive’. This judgment, which is presumed to be controversial, seems not to be the 
only one in the matter64.  
 In relation to the general statistics, replies to the last questionnaire submitted by 
Member States to the Commission that date back to the year 2015, provide some figures, 
taking into account that not all Member States sent answers to such questionnaire. This 
one was published on 28 September 2017 65  and the Commission analyses different 
quantitative as well as some qualitative information provided by the Member States, who 
answered the standard questionnaire elaborated by the Council at the time66. Furthermore, 
a general background resulting from prior replies by Member States to this questionnaire 
is included in e-justice portal67 with total figures from different years. As an example, it 
can be mentioned that 16.144 EAWs were issued in 2015 and 5.304 EAWs were executed, 
on average 50% surrenders with the consent of the requested person. This fact also affects 
to time-limits on surrender because if the consent takes place, the average time is fourteen 





3. EUROPEAN INVESTIGATION ORDER 
 
3.1 General background 
 
Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 
2014 regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal matters 68  (hereinafter 
 
64 See application C-685/18, Minister for Justice and Equality, referred by the High Court of Ireland, where 
also it is requested if the public prosecutor of this country, who is considered to be independent from the 
executive and participates in the administration of justice, is an issuing judicial authority according to Art. 
6 (1) EAW. Nevertheless, the referring court decided to withdraw the request for preliminary ruling on 14 
December 2018 and, subsequently, Order of the President of the Court on 21 December 2018, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:1050, rules the removal of the case from the Register of the Court.  
65 Commission Staff Working Document – Replies to questionnaire on quantitative information on the 
practical operation of the European arrest warrant – Year 2015, SWD (2017) 320 final.  
66 Council document 11356/13 of 24 June 2013, COPEN 97, EJN 40, EUROJUST 47, available at It 
contains specific questions such as how many EAWs have been issued and for which category of offence, 
how many persons have been arrested, how many surrender proceedings have been initiated, how many 
requested persons consented the surrender, how many days did the surrender procedure take, in how many 
cases the executing judicial authority refused the EAW’s execution and for which grounds,… 
67 In concrete at https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_european_arrest_warrant-90-en.do (last access on 28 
May 2019).  
68 OJ, n. L 130, 1 May 2014, p. 1-36. 
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DEIO) is a new and comprehensive instrument aimed at the gathering of evidence located 
in another EU country69.  
 
The Directive is based on the principle of mutual recognition, according to Article 
82(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). This principle 
was declared at the Tampere European Council of 15 and 16 October 1999 70  as the 
cornerstone of judicial cooperation in criminal matters. However, at the same time it takes 
into account the flexibility of the traditional mutual legal assistance mechanisms.  
 
DEIO is divided into 46 Recitals, seven Chapters and 39 Articles. Chapter I “The 
European Investigation Order”, Chapter II “Procedures and safeguards for the issuing 
State”, Chapter III “Procedures and safeguards for the executing State”, Chapter IV 
“Specific provisions for certain investigative measures”, Chapter V “Interception of 
Telecommunications”, Chapter VI “Provisional measures” and Chapter VII “Final 
provisions”.  
 
According to article 1(1) of the DEIO, an EIO is a ‘judicial decision’ issued or 
validated by the competent judicial authority of a Member State (the issuing State) to 
have one or several specific investigative measure(s) carried out in another Member State 
(the executing State) to obtain evidence.  
 
The deadline for its transposition expired on the 22 May 2017 and the process of 
implementation is concluded71.  
Luxembourg was the last country which implemented the Directive on 11 
September 2018, while Denmark and Ireland are not bound by the Directive (Recital 44 
and 45).  
 
 
69 As an initiative of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, the Republic of Estonia, the 
Kingdom of Spain and the Republic of Austria on 2010. 
70  Tampere European Council 15 and 16 October 1999 Presidency Conclusions, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm (last access on 30 May 2019). 
71  On the status of implementation of Directive see: https://www.ejn-
crimjust.europa.eu/ejn/EJN_StaticPage.aspx?Bread=10001 (last access on 28 May 2019). 
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3.2 Scope of the DEIO. Art. 34 DEIO 
 
The EIO may also be issued for obtaining evidence that is already in the 
possession of the competent authorities of the executing Member State (Art. 1(1)). It does 
not cover the setting up of joint investigation teams and the gathering of evidence within 
such teams (Art. 3), a matter still regulated by the FD 2002/465/JHA of 13 June 2002, on 
joint investigation teams. Moreover, the DEIO should not apply to cross-border 
surveillance as referred to in Article 40 of the Convention implementing the Schengen 
Agreement of 14 June 1985 (hereinafter: CISA).  
 
One of the first and most pragmatic issues posed by the entry into force of DEIO 
was related to the interpretation of Art. 34(1) of the DEIO, according to which from 22 
May 2017 the Directive ‘replaces’ several instruments of judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters, applicable between Member States bound by this Directive. European 
conventions as listed under Art. 34 (1) DEIO are the European Convention on Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters of the Council of Europe of 20 April 195972 as well as its 
two protocols73 ; CISA74  and Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 
between the Member States of the European Union (henceforth MLA) 75  and its 
protocol76. Prior the European Convention of 20 April 1959 signed within the framework 
of the Council of Europe (MLA Convention 1959) operated as essential rule regarding 
the gathering of evidence in criminal matters in another Member State till the enforcement 
of MLA 2000 on August 23rd 200577. 
 
72 ETS n. 030, available at http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/030 (last 
access on 28 May 2019).  
73 Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, ETS n. 099, 
and Second Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, 
ETS n. 182, available at http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-
/conventions/webContent/en_GB/7763526 (last access on 28 May 2019). 
74 Signed on 19 June 1990, OJ, n. L 239, 22 September 2000, p. 19, today considered Schengen acquis 
integrated into the framework of the European Union according to Protocol (No) 19 to Treaties on the 
European Union and on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ, n. C 115, 9 May 2008, p. 290. 
75 Council Act of 29 May 2000 establishing in accordance with Article 34 of the Treaty on the European 
Union the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the 
European Union (2000/C 197/01), OJ, n. C 197, 12 July 2000, p. 1. 
76 Protocol established by the Council in accordance with Article 34 of the Treaty on the European Union 
to the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European 
Union, OJ, n. C 326, 21 November 2001, p. 2.  
77 MORÁN MARTÍNEZ, R.A. “La orden Europea de Investigación”, in M. Jimeno Bulnes (dir.)  and R. 
Miguel Barrio (ed.), Espacio judicial europeo y proceso penal, op. cit., pp.163-186; JIMENO BULNES, 
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Moreover, the DEIO replaces, for Member States bound by the Directive, FD 
2008/978/JHA on the European Evidence Warrant (hereinafter EEW), for obtaining 
objects, documents and data for use in proceedings in criminal matters of 18 December 
2008, and has been annulled by Regulation 2016/95 of the Parliament and Council of 20 
January 2016 and also the provisions of FD 2003/577/JHA concerning orders freezing 
property or evidence of 22 July 2003, as far as freezing of evidence is concerned. This 
matter is now regulated by Article 32 DEIO, named “Provisional measures”. Therefore, 
the FD 2003/577/JHA is still in force for freezing orders for the purpose of subsequent 
confiscation, a matter that is not covered by the DEIO. It shall be noted that the DEIO 
does not either apply to confiscation regulated at European level by FD 2006/783/JHA, 
on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to confiscation orders and by 
Directive 2014/42/EU 78 , on the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and 
proceeds of crime. 
 
It should be mentioned that following the teleological/pragmatic interpretation 
provided by the Italian desk of Eurojust and by the European Judicial Network (EJN), the 
word ‘replaces’ has been interpreted in the sense that does not entail the automatic 
abolition of all the previous normative instruments adopted in the field of judicial 
assistance: they will still be applied in situations where the DEIO is not applicable, such 
as for instance in relation to Denmark and Ireland, which are not bound by the Directive, 
and also in relation to Member States that have not completely transposed the DEIO79. 
 
M. ‘Orden europea de investigación en materia penal’, in M. Jimeno Bulnes (ed.), Aproximación legislativa 
versus reconocimiento mutuo en el desarrollo del espacio judicial europeo: una perspectiva 
multidisciplinar, Bosch, 2016, pp. 151-208; BACHMAIER WINTER, L. ‘European investigation order for 
obtaining evidence in the criminal proceedings. Study of the proposal for a European directive’, Zeitschrift 
für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik 2010,n.9, pp. 580-589, at p. 581; also ALLEGREZZA, S. “Critical 
remarks on the Green Paper on obtaining evidence in criminal matters from one Member State to another 
and securing its admissibility”, Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik 2010, n.9, p. 569-579. 
More extensively BELFIORE, R. “The European Investigation Order in criminal matters: developments in 
evidence-gathering across the EU”, European Criminal Law Review 2015, vol. 5, n. 3, pp. 312-324 and, 
specifically, MANGIARACINA, A. “A new and controversial scenario in the gathering of evidence at the 
European level. The Proposal for a Directive on the European Investigation Order”, Utrecht Law Review 
2014, n. 1, vol. 10, pp.113-133, at p. 115.  
78 Spain has transposed Directive in Arts. 803 ter a – 803 ter Spanish Act on Criminal Procedure (Ley de 
Enjuiciamiento Criminal, henceforth LECrim) by Law 41/2015, of 5 October, on amendment of Act on 
Criminal Procedure for the speeding of criminal justice and the strengthening of procedural safeguards;  
79 Eurojust, Note on the meaning of “corresponding provisions” and the applicable legal regime in case of 
delayed transposition of the EIO Directive, p. 5, affirm that a majority of national authorities consulted 
were in favour of a pragmatic/teleological approach. A few national draft EIO laws prescribe the continued 
use of EU CMACM in relation to Member State that did not implement in time (draft laws in HU, RO and 
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Such an interpretation would be in line with the aim of the Directive and with the 
application of the principle of interpretation in accordance with the contents of Directives, 
as developed by the CJEU80. 
 
 
3.3 Subjects  
 
3.3.1      Competent authorities  
 
In relation to the subjects who can issue an EIO, following its definition as ‘a 
judicial decision which has been issued or validated by a judicial authority of a Member 
State’ (Art. 1), the issuing authority it is a judicial authority. However, the meaning of the 
concept “judicial authority” depends on the structure of each normative procedural 
system81.  
It is important to emphasize the useful and practical work by the EJN helping to 
use the EIO across Member States since following article 2(c) the concept issuing 
authority can be defined as “a judge, a court, an investigating judge or a public 
prosecutor competent in the case concerned; or, any other competent authority as defined 
by the issuing State which, in the specific case, is acting in its capacity as an investigating 
authority in criminal proceedings with competence to order the gathering of evidence in 
accordance with national law (…). In this last case, before an EIO is transmitted to the 
executing State, it shall be validated by a judge, investigating judge or a public prosecutor.
 
The document “Competent authorities, languages accepted, urgent matters and 
scope of the EIO Directive1of the instrument in the EU Member States”82 synthetizes the 
 
SK). French law which transposed EIO legislation prescribes the treatment of incoming MLA requests from 
Member States that have not yet transposed DEIO as if they were EIO (Article 5 of the Ordonnance of 1 
December 2016).  
80 CJEU, 16 June 2005, Pupino, C-105/03, ECLI:EU:C:2005:386. 
81 See JIMENO BULNES, M., “Orden europea de investigación en materia penal: una perspectiva europea 
y española, in T. Bene (ed.), l’Ordine europeo di indagine, G. Giappichelli, Torino, 2016, pp. 23-26; 
SAYERS D., The European Investigation Order. Travelling without a ‘roadmap’, Centre for European 
Policy Studies (CEPS), 2011, available at http://www.ceps.eu, at p.9. 
82 European Judicial Network, “Competent authorities, languages accepted, urgent matters and scope of the 
EIO Directive1of the instrument in the EU Member States”, available at 
https://www.ejnforum.eu/cp/registry-files/3339/Competent-authorities-languages-accepted-scope-
290419f.pdf (last access on 30 May 2019). 
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different and varied competent authorities depending on each Member State. It should be 
highlighted that five different authorities in the legal procedure can be found: 
1. Issuing authorities 
2. Validating authorities 
3. Receiving authorities 
4. Executing authorities 
5. Central/specific authorities  
 
Each Member State has pointed these different authorities according to their own 
national legislation.83 In this point, it is important to note that as it was indicated in the 
framework of the “Eurojust meeting on the European investigation order”84 despite the 
direct contact among the different national authorities, the characteristic of the EIO is 
essential, the role of Eurojust facilitating communication between the authorities involved 
in case the communication or relation is triggered and improving the coordination. 
 
 
3.3.2      The role of defence 
 
Regarding the exercise of defence rights, the text of the Directive expressly grants 
the possibility to request the issuing of an EIO ‘within the framework of applicable 
defence rights in conformity with national criminal procedure’ (Art. 1(3)  of the DEIO) 
to the suspected, the accused and their lawyers. As underlined by scholars, although this 
provision is aimed at realizing the principle of equality of arms, it does not recognise an 
autonomous direct request of legal assistance to a foreign judicial authority. In this regard, 
Article 4(1) of the DEIO stressed the obligation to respect the fundamental rights and 
legal principles declared in Article 6  of the TEU, including the rights of defence of 
persons subject to criminal proceedings. This necessity to respect human rights can affect 
one of the most important principles in the area of freedom, security and justice within 
 
83 See KOSTORIS, R. E. (ed.), Handbook of European Criminal Procedure, Springer, Netherlands, 2018; 
MITSILEGAS, V. “European Criminal Law After Brexit”, Criminal Law Forum 2017, vol. 28, n. 2, pp. 
219–250; European Parliament, Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Study. 
Criminal procedural laws across the European Union – A comparative analysis of selected main 
differences and the impact they have over the development of EU legislation, PE 604.977, 2018. 
84 Report Eurojust meeting on the European investigation order. The Hague, 19-20 September 2018, n.11 
December 2018, p.16. 
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the EU: mutual trust based in the confidence and presumption that Member States respect 
Union law, especially, human rights. Nevertheless, following Recital 19 of the DEIO, this 
principle of mutual trust can be affected by the destruction of the previous presumption 
of compliance. In this last scenario, the execution of the EIO can be refused.  
 
 
3.4 EIO issuing and transmission 
  
The principle of proportionality has been specifically addressed in the text of the 
DEIO among the conditions for issuing and transmitting an EIO. Indeed, Art. 6 provides 
that “The issuing authority may only issue an EIO where (...): (a) the issuing of the EIO 
is necessary and proportionate for the purpose of the proceedings referred to in Article 
4 taking into account the rights of the suspected or accused person (...)”. It also specifies 
that in each case the condition shall be assessed by the issuing authority (Article 6(2)).85  
In the framework of the meetings organised by EJN, some problems were 
mentioned in the practical application of an EIO. The limit applying EIO only in cause of 
minor offences provokes the problem in finding a common understanding of “minor 
offences”86. Both the issuing authority and the executing authority will assess whether it 
is proportionate to issue or to execute an EOI or not. It may possible that they have 
different valuation.  
DEIO incorporates an Annex A, the format to fill in issuing an EIO. This format 
contains the essential data related to: 
(a) data about the issuing authority and, where applicable, the validating 
authority; 
(b) the object of and reasons for the EIO; 
(c) the necessary information available on the person(s) concerned; 
 
85 See specifically BACHMAIER WINTER, L., “Remote computer searches under Spanish Law: The 
proportionality principle and the protection of privacy”, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft  
2017, vol. 129 n. 1, pp. 205-231, esp. p. 206;  BACHMAIER WINTER, L. ‘The role of the proportionality 
principle in cross-border investigations involving fundamental rights’ in S. Ruggeri, (ed.) Transnational 
Inquiries and the Protection of Fundamental Rights in Criminal Proceedings, Springer, Heidelberg, New 
York, 2013, pp. 85-110; also same author especially addressed to EIO, BACHMAIER WINTER, L. ‘La 
orden europea de investigación y el principio de proporcionalidad’, Revista General de Derecho Europeo 
2011, n.25 http://www.iustel.com  
86 European Judicial Network, Conclusions 2018 On the European Investigation Order (EIO), Brussels, 7 
December 2018, p. 6, available at https://www.ejnforum.eu/cp/registry-files/3456/ST-14755-2018-INIT-
EN.pdf (last access on 30 May 2019). 
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(d) a description of the criminal act, which is the subject of the investigation or 
proceedings, and the applicable provisions of the criminal law of the issuing State; 
(e) a description of the investigative measures(s) requested and the evidence to be 
obtained. 
 
EJN identifies some best practices related to Annex A87. Such as issuing only one 
EIO in cases of several measures addressed to the same competent executing authority, 
mentioning the suspect, indicating “urgency” only in case of a real need, identifying 
person(s) concerned, presenting the summary with short sentences or being precise.  
In relation to the language that can be used, a common opinion suggested that 
Article 5(2) of the EIO Directive is “obliging the executing Member State to accept other 
EU languages than their own” according to “Extracts from Conclusions of Plenary 
meetings of the EJN concerning the practical application of the EIO” by the General 
Secretariat of the Council88.  
To the transmission of the EIO, “any means capable of producing a written record 
under conditions allowing the executing State to stablish authenticity” can be used 
according to Article 7(1) DEIO.  In this phase, the national central authority/ies can play 
an essential role assisting the competent authorities89.  
An e-evidence platform is on-going according to the information provided by the 
Commission90. This platform would improve the secure transmission of an EIO. 
 
Regarding the types of proceedings for which the EIO can be issued, according to 
Article 4 DEIO, an EIO can be issued in the framework of criminal proceedings, 
administrative proceedings and judicial proceedings by virtue of being infringements of 
the rules of law, and where the decision may give rise to proceedings before a court having 
 
87 EJN, Conclusions 2018, op. cit. p. 8. 
88 Council of the European Union, Extracts from Conclusions of Plenary meetings of the EJN concerning 
the practical application of the EIO, Brussels, 8 December 2017, available at 
https://www.ejnforum.eu/cp/registry-files/3373/ST-15210-2017-INIT-EN-COR-1.pdf (last access on 30 
May 2019). 
89 See generally on Spanish criminal procedure GASCÓN INCHAUSTI, F. and VILLAMARÍN LÓPEZ, 
M.L ‘Criminal procedure in Spain’, in R. Vogler and B. Huber (eds.), Criminal procedure in Europe, 
Duncker & Humblot, 2008, pp. 541-653. Also specifically BACHMAIER WINTER, L. and DEL MORAL 
GARCÍA, A. Criminal Law in Spain, Wolters Kluwer, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2012, p. 205 ff.; PÉREZ GIL, 
J. “Medidas de investigación tecnológica en el proceso penal español: privacidad vs. eficacia en la 
persecución”, in R. Brighi (ed. lit.), M. Palmirani (ed. lit.), M. E. Sánchez Jordán (ed. lit.), Informatica 
giuridica e informatica forense al servizio della società della conoscenza: scritti in onore di Cesare Maioli, 
Aracne Editrice, Italia, 2018, pp. 187-198. 
90 Report Eurojust meeting on the European investigation order, op. cit. p. 15. 
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jurisdiction, in particular, in criminal matters; and proceedings related to the previous one 
in which the offences or infringements may imply to be held liable or punished in the 
issuing State.  
 
 
3.5 EIO recognition and execution 
 
As an instrument based on the principle of mutual recognition, an EIO transmitted 
according to the DEIO should be executed without any further formality (Article 9(1) of 
the DEIO) and with the same celerity and priority as for a similar domestic case or in a 
shorter deadline in case of urgent circumstances (Article 12 DEIO)91.  
 
However, it is possible that the executing authority recourses to a different 
investigative measure if the measure indicated in the EIO does not exist or if this 
particular measure would not be available in a similar domestic case following Article 10 
of the DEIO). 
 
On the other hand, general grounds for non-recognition or non-execution are listed 
in Article 11 of the DEIO as optional. Other specific grounds for non-recognition are 
listed with regard to specific investigative measures.  
According to Article 11 DEIO, an EIO may be refused in the executing State in 
case of (a) immunity or a privilege under the law of the executing State; whether the 
execution (b) would harm essential national security interests, jeopardise the source of 
the information or involve the use of classified information;(c) whether the investigative 
measure would not be authorised under the law of the executing State in a similar 
domestic case; (d) in case of violation of the principle of ne bis in idem; (e) according to 
the principle of territoriality; (f) in case of incompatibility with Article 6 TEU and the 
Charter; (g) whether the offence(s) is not a crime in the national criminal law of the 
executing State (except in case of the 32 offences listed in Annex D to which the principle 
of double criminality do not apply); (h) in case of certain restriction of the measures 
according to certain type of crimes. 
 
91 Without the prejudice of Article 15 DEIO which allow to the executing authority to postpone the 
recognition or execution in certain circumstances. 
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Art. 11 (1) (d) of the DEIO provides as a ground for optional refusal of recognition 
or execution of the EIO the fact that it is contrary to the ne bis in idem principle. Such a 
narrow forecast should be interpreted in accordance with the explanations given in Recital 
17 of the own DEIO. Explanations, which, as doctrine has emphasized92, should not go 
unnoticed by the national legal operator. Recital 17 in the DEIO Preamble states, on the 
one hand, 'The principle of ne bis in idem is a fundamental principle of law in the Union, 
as recognized by the Charter and developed by the case-law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union. Therefore the executing authority should be entitled to refuse the 
execution of an EIO if its execution would be contrary to that principle'; on the other 
hand, due ‘to the preliminary nature of the procedures underlying an EIO, its execution 
should not be subject to refusal where it is aimed to establish whether a possible conflict 
with the ne bis in idem principle exists, or where the issuing authority has provided 
assurances that the evidence transferred as a result of the execution of the EIO would not 
be used to prosecute or impose a sanction on a person whose case has been finally 
disposed of in another Member State for the same facts.’ In relation to the previous idea, 
it is clear that DEIO establishes two exceptions to the refusal of recognition and 
enforcement of an EIO based on ne bis in idem. The first of these exceptions is supported 
by the necessity to ensure the practical effectiveness of this right by the issuing authority. 
The second one presupposes the non-infringement of ne bis in idem (although only in 
respect of proceedings and/or final decisions in the Member States), since the transfer of 
evidence is subject to the undertaking or guarantee provided in such meaning by the 
issuing authority.  
 
In relation to the principle of territoriality, in case of an EIO issued for an offence 
committed outside the territory of the issuing State and wholly or partially on the territory 
of the executing State, judicial authorities will apply the general condition based on the 
principle of double criminality, with its exceptions where the EIO has been issued for 
 
92 See specifically AGUILERA MORALES, M. “El ne bis in idem: un derecho fundamental en el ámbito 
de la Unión Europea”, Civitas: Revista española de Derecho europeo 2006, vol. 20, pp. 479-531. Also, in 
general VERVAELE, J. A. E. “The transnational ne bis in idem principle in the EU. Mutual recognition 
and equivalent protection of human rights”, Utrecht Law Review 2005, vol. 1, n. 2, pp. 100-118. 
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offences listed in Article 11 of the DEIO or for investigative acts mentioned in Article 10 
(2) of the DEIO93. 
Once an EIO is transmitted, the authority of execution shall take a decision on 
recognition of execution in no later than 30 days after the receipt of the EIO (Article 12(3) 
DEIO). Since that moment, the execution shall carry out in no more than 90 days.  
 
This deadline is shorter in case of issuing an EIO to take provisional measures in 
order to prevent the destruction, transformation, removal, transfer or disposal of an item 
used as evidence. According to Article 32, the executing authority shall communicate the 
decision within 24 hours.  
 
According to Article 13 DEIO, the transference of the evidence shall take place 
without undue delay. Objects, documents or data transferred can be temporally 
transferred again in case that is relevant for other proceedings.  
 
It should be noted that the execution on an EIO can be suspended while resolving 
a legal remedy whether it is provided in similar domestic cases. Following Article 14 
DEIO, an EIO can be challenged in the issuing State in relation to the substantive reasons 
for issuing an EIO. An EIO may be challenged in the executing State by reasons related 
to fundamental rights. These situations shall be informed by the respective authority to 
the other one involved (Article 16 of the DEIO). 
 
During the execution of an EIO, all the authorities shall respect the principle of 
confidentiality (Article 19 of the DEIO), and the protection of personal data shall be 
 
93 See MARTÍN GARCÍA, A.L and BUJOSA VADELL, L. La obtención de prueba en materia penal en 
la Unión Europea, Atelier, Barcelona, 2016, at p. 118. See BELFIORE, R. ‘Riflessioni a margine della 
Direttiva sull’ordine europeo d’indagine penale’, Cassazione penale 2015, n. 9, pp. 3288-3296, at p. 3294. 
See TINOCO PASTRANA, A. “L’ordine europeo d’indagine penale”, Processo penale e giustizia 2017, 
n.2, pp. 346-358, at p. 349. See BACHMAIER WINTER, L. “Transnational evidence. Towards the 
transposition of Directive 2014/41 regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal matters”, Eucrim 
2015, n. 2, p. 47-60 at p. 50. MORÁN MARTINEZ, R. A. “Obtención y utilización de la prueba 
transnacional”, Revista de Derecho Penal 2010, n.30, pp. 79-102, at pp. 92 ff; also GRANDE 
MARLASKA-GÓMEZ, F. and DEL POZO PÉREZ, M. “La obtención de Fuentes de prueba en la Unión 
Europea y su validez en el proceso penal español”, Revista General de Derecho Europeo 2011, n. 24 
htto://www.iustel.com, at p. 16 ff. In international panorama see VERMEULEN, G., DE BONDT, W. and 
VAN DAMME, Y. EU cross-border gathering and use of evidence in criminal matters. Towards mutual 
recognition of investigative measures and free movement of evidence?, IRPC series, 2010, vol. 37, Maklu, 
pp. 51 ff. 
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ensured by Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA (17) and the principles of the 
Council of Europe Convention for the protection of Individuals with regard to the 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data of 28 January 1981 and its Additional Protocol 
(Article 20 DEIO).  
The costs caused by the execution of an EIO shall be borne by the executing State 
according to 21 DEIO. In case of exceptionally high costs on the executing State, both 
States have to agree which costs can be considered on that classification. The issuing 
authority can decide to withdraw the EIO or, on the contrary, to pay the part of the costs 
considered exceptionally high (Recital 23 and Article 21).  
 
 
3.6 Specific provisions for certain investigative measures 
 
The Directive has provided that Member States shall ensure legal remedies 
equivalent to those available in a similar domestic case, and has specified that the 
substantive reasons for issuing the EIO may be challenged only in an action brought in 
the issuing State, ‘without prejudice to the guarantees of fundamental rights in the 
executing State’ (Art. 14(1) (2)).  
 
Chapter IV of the DEIO under the heading ‘Specific Provisions for certain 
investigative measures’ (Arts. 22-30 of the DEIO) provides for certain investigative 
measures that are aimed at favouring admissibility and the use of evidence in the criminal 
proceedings in the issuing Member State. Some of these measures resemble the ones 
already provided for under the EU CMLACM, such as interception of communications.  
 
In particular, the Directive has included rules on the temporary transfer of persons 
held in custody (to the issuing and the executing State (Arts. 22 and 23 of the DEIO); on 
the hearing by videoconference, other audiovisual transmission and telephone (Articles 
24 and 25 of the DEIO); measures aimed at obtaining information on banking and 
financial accounts and operations (Articles. 26 and 27), as well as certain measures 
implying the gathering of evidence in real time (Article 28); covert investigations (Article 
29) and interception of communications (Article 30 and 31 of the DEIO)94. 
 
94  On the topic, PÉREZ GIL, J. “Medidas de investigación tecnológica en el proceso penal español: 
privacidad vs. eficacia en la persecución”, in R. Brighi (ed.), Informatica giuridica e informatica forense 
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3.7 CJEU case-law  
 
DEIO is a quite current cooperation instrument implemented into the national 
legal system in a recent period of the time.  
 
The first preliminary ruling was presented from the Spetsializiran nakazatelen sad 
(Bulgaria) on 31 May 2017 Criminal proceedings against Ivan Gavanozov95.  Opinion by 
General Advocate Mr. Yves Bot was delivered on 11 April 2019. 
 
The questions asked by the Bulgarian court were: 
 
- 1. Are national legislation and case-law consistent with Article 14 DEIO, 
in so far as they preclude a challenge, either directly as an appeal against a court decision 
or indirectly by means of a separate claim for damages, to the substantive grounds of a 
court decision issuing a European investigation order for a search on residential and 
business premises and the seizure of specific items, and allowing examination of a 
witness?  
- 2. Does Article 14(2) of the directive grant, in an immediate and direct 
manner, to a concerned party the right to challenge a court decision issuing a European 
investigation order, even where such a procedural step is not provided for by national 
law?  
- 3. Is the person against whom a criminal charge was brought, in the light 
of Article 14(2) in connection with Article 6(1)(a) and Article 1(4) of the directive, a 
 
al servizio della società della conoscenza, Aracne, Roma, 2018, pp. 187-198, p. 188. GARCIMARTÍN 
MONTERO, R. ‘The European Investigation Order and the respect of fundamental rights in criminal 
investigations’, Eucrim 2017, n.1, p. 45-50. Also MARTINEZ GARCÍA, E. “La orden de investigación 
europea. Las futuras complejidades previsibles en la implementación de la Directiva en España”, La Ley 
Penal 2014, n. 106, available at http://revistas.laley.es, at p. 5. In general on the AFSJ see AGUILERA 
MORALES, M. “Justicia penal y Unión Europea: un breve balance en clave de derechos”, Diario La Ley 
2016, n. 8883, http://diariolaley.laley.es.  See JIMENO BULNES, M. “La Directiva 2013/48/UE del 
Parlamento europeo y del Consejo de 22 de octubre de 2013 sobre los derechos de asistencia letrada y 
comunicación en el proceso penal: ¿realidad al fin?”, Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo 2014, 
vol.18, n.48, pp. 443-489, at p. 461; also BACHMAIER WINTER, L. ‘The EU Directive on the right to 
access to a lawyer: a critical assessment’, in S. Ruggeri (ed.), Human rights in European Criminal Law, 
Springer, 2015, pp. 111-131, p.119. 
95  OJ, 7 August 2017, C-324/17, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/en/TXT/PDF/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.C_.2017.256.01.0016.01.ENG (last access on 31 May 2019). 
 
39 
concerned party, within the meaning of Article 14(4), if the measures for collection of 
evidence are directed at third party?  
- 4. Is the person who occupies the property in which the search and seizure 
was carried out or the person who is to be examined as a witness a concerned party within 
the meaning of Article 14(4) in connection with Article 14(2) of the directive? 
 
According to the Conclusions by Advocate General: 
 
1) Article 14 DEIO must be interpreted as meaning that it is contrary to the 
Member State’ legal system, such as Bulgarian legislation, which in no way establishes 
the possibility of challenging the substantive grounds of an investigation measure subject 
to a European Investigation Order, as well as an authority of that Member State can issue 
an European Investigation Order . 
2) Article 14 of Directive 2014/41 cannot be invoked by an individual before a 
national court to challenge the substantive grounds for which a European Investigation 
Order has been issued when national law does not provide for remedies in the framework 
of similar national procedures. 
3) The concept of 'interested party' within the meaning of Directive 2014/41 
includes both the witness who is the subject of the investigative measures requested in a 
European Investigation Order and the person against whom the criminal charge has been 
brought, even if the research measures established in a European research order are not 
addressed to it96. 
 
This provisional resolution at a European Judicial level represent an important 
first step into highlighting the requirement imposed by the DEIO regarding the prevision 
of legal remedies at a national level. The transcendence of this prevision provokes the 
impossibility to invoke Article 14 DEIO by an individual in case of not prevision in the 
national legal system. 
On the other hand, the Opinion by the General Advocate in relation to the concept 
of “interested party” would finish with the doubts regarding whether a witness or a third 
part can be defined as “interested party” as an undetermined concept used by DEIO. 
 
96 Conclusions of the General Advocate Mr. Y. Bot, presented on 11 April, 2019, ECLI: EU: C: 2019: 312, 
available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62017CC0324&lang1=en&type=TXT&ancre= 
(last access on 31 May 2019). 
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With an indirect connection to EIO, other case law can be found assessing other 
measures or principles. For instance, the prohibition of incurring bis in idem is configured 
as a right whose scope and meaning have been outlined by the Court of Justice of the EU 
in a progressive manner at Union level, and unlike in other supranational fields, the 
recognition of non bis ídem as an inherent right came only with the wording of Article 50 
of the CEDF.  This Article states that ‘no one shall be liable to be tried or punished again 
in criminal proceedings for an offence for which he or she has already been finally 
acquitted or convicted within the Union in accordance with the law’. However, prior to 
its proclamation in the Charter, the prohibition of non bis in idem entitled the Court of 
Justice of the European Union to consider it a general principle of Community Law, under 
Articles 54 to 58 of the CISA. It is thus explained that this Convention -which, by the 
way, the DEOI is replacing ex  art. 34 (1) (b), except for Ireland and Denmark as prior 
said- constitutes the normative basis for a good part of the ECJ rulings on non bis in 
idem,97 although there is no shortage of decisions on the application of this right in the 
context of mutual recognition instruments. 
At a European level, the principle is stated by both Art. 4 of the 7th Protocol to 
the ECHR and Art. 50 of the CFREU. According to the former, “No one shall be liable 
to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same 
State for an offence for which he has already been finally acquitted or convicted in 
accordance with the law and penal procedure of that State”; according to the latter, “No 
one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings for an offence 
for which he or she has already been finally acquitted or convicted within the Union in 
accordance with the law”.  
 
As far as its scope is concerned, one of the peculiarities of the banning of bis in 
idem at Union level is that it covers both the material or substantive dimension of this 
principle (duplicity of sanctions) and its procedural dimension (duplicity of processes), 
but this last dimension -and this is the peculiarity compared to the way in which 
proscription acts internally -only in cases where the duality of processes derives from an 
 
97 It is important to bear in mind at least the wording of such Art. 54: ‘A person whose trial has been finally 
disposed of in one Contracting Party may not be prosecuted in another Contracting Party for the same acts 
provided that, if a penalty has been imposed, it has been enforced, is actually in the process of being 
enforced or can no longer be enforced under the laws of the sentencing Contracting Party’. 
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earlier process terminated by firm resolution on the crux of the matter. This means that 
non bis in idem does not cover situations of international lis pendens, but it does not mean 
either that a second procedure cannot be ruled out even if there is an ongoing enforcement 
process either in the executing state itself or in another state of the Union. In view of it, 
therefore, non bis in idem does not reach international lis pendens cases and that, unlike 
other instruments of mutual recognition,98 DOEI says nothing about lis pendens as ground 
for refusing recognition or execution of an OEI. For this reason, it is clear that this cannot 
be based on the fact that, on the same facts and with respect to the same subject, there is 
an ongoing criminal proceeding either in our country or in another state of the Union. 
Non bis in idem is not confined to the criminal sphere but extends to the broader 
sanctioning area. It covers both the double procedure (administrative and criminal) and 
the double sanction (administrative and criminal) interdiction, but only in those cases 
where the administrative procedure and/or penalty is ‘criminal in nature’. This 
categorization requires compliance with three parameters: (1) the legal classification of 
the offense in accordance with the domestic law of the state where it is envisaged; (2) the 
very nature of the infringement; and (3) the nature and severity of the sanction that may 
be imposed on the interested party99. It is therefore understood that, from Luxembourg, it 
has been held that Art. 50 CFREU does not preclude a Member State from imposing on 
the same person and for the same facts a failure to comply with declaratory obligations 
in the field of VAT, which is at the same time tax surcharge and a criminal penalty100. Or 
whether the penalty is to be taken into account in respect of the sanction is to deprive the 
farmer who makes certain false declarations in order to obtain such aid and the criminal 
conviction of that farmer for subsidization fraud. 
 
This legal doctrine from the Court of Justice of the European Union seems to fit 
in its formulation with that coined by the Spanish courts as to when the concurrence of 
 
98 See Arts. 4 (2) EAW FWD and 32 (1) (a) LRM. 
99 This list corresponds to the criteria which, according to the ECHR, must be examined in order to 
determine whether the duplication of administrative and criminal sanctions infringes the non bis in idem 
enshrined in Protocol No 7 to the ECHR. At this point, however, attention should be drawn to the judgement 
pronounced by ECtHR, GC, 15 November 2016, A and B c. Norway, appls. n. 24130/11 and 29758/11, 
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-168972 (last access on 28 July 2017). As the CJEU points 
out in Order on 25 January 2017, Menci, C 524/15, available as further ECJ judgements at official website 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/en/ it is possible that this ruling may radiate its influence at Union 
level and that it is therefore not permissible to refuse a request for judicial cooperation in proceedings on 
the basis of non bis in idem, despite the existence of a duplication of sanctions and the possibility of being 
criminalized. 
100 CJEU, 26 February 2013, Fransson, C-617/10, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105. 
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criminal and administrative sanctions violates the constitutional prohibition of non bis in 
idem. The fact is that when this guarantee is linked to the so-called triple identity 
requirement –i.e., identity of subject, identity of fact and identity of foundation-, it is 
assumed that where the latter is lacking (that is, where protected and the sanction, criminal 
and administrative, is proportionate) the successive exercise of ius puniendi and the 














For more than two decades, the European Union has been showing interest to 
guarantee territorial defence for all suspects of having commissioned a criminal offence.  
 
As a matter of fact, on the occasion of the European Council celebrated in Nice 
on 7th December 2000, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union was 
signed and solemnly proclaimed. Its article 48.2, in the section on “justice”, states that 
the rights of the defence of anyone who has been charged shall be guaranteed. 
  
The Charter contains, for the first time in the history of the European Union in a 
single text, a compilation of all civil, political, economic and social rights of European 
 
101 Summarized case law in SSTC, 10 December 1991, n. 234 and 11 October 1999, n. 177, both available 
at http://hj.tribunalconstitucional.es/HJ/es/Busqueda/Index  
101 CJEU, 16 November 2010, Mantello, C-261/09, ECLI:EU:C:2010:683. 
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citizens and all people living in the territory of the European Union classified in six large 
sections: dignity, freedoms, equality, solidarity, citizens’ rights and justice102. 
 
Since the year 2000 up to the present time, the European Union has come a long 
way towards the harmonization of the procedural safeguards in its territory. Throughout 
this period, three stages can be clearly distinguished; a first one that can be described as 
a study and is materialized with the Green Paper of the Commission (2003), a second and 
failed stage represented by the proposal for a council framework Decision (2004), and a 
third and last (simultaneous to the enforcement of the Treaty of Lisbon) that culminates 
the proposals and implements the Roadmap to strengthen the procedural rights of suspects 
and accused persons in criminal proceedings (2009). 
 
In this last period, two different stages can be differentiated. On the one hand, in 
the period from the year 2010 to 2013, three directives on the right to interpretation and 
translation and on the right to legal representation are approved. On the other, a period 
driven by the introduction of a new series of measures by the Commission that gives 
green light in 2016 to the appearance of other three new directives regarding the 
presumption of innocence, rights of minors and legal aid. 
 
This paper aims to show a general overview of the results arising from the 
legislative initiative of the European Union in matters of procedural rights of suspected 
and accused persons and the six directives in connection therewith published to date. 
 
We will first analyse the history of those legal instruments by skimmingly 
examining the Green Paper and the failed proposal for a council framework Decision with 
regard to procedural rights in criminal proceedings throughout the European Union. 
 
 
4.2 The Green Paper of the Commission (2003) 
 
 






Two years after the promulgation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, the Commission adopted on 19 February 2003 the “Green Paper on 
Procedural Safeguards for Suspects and Defendants in Criminal Proceedings throughout 
the European Union”103. 
 
Previous to the drafting of formal proposals, this document was aimed at closely 
analyzing the standards of procedural safeguards in the European Union.  
 
To this effect, two kinds of measures were adopted. On the one hand, a document 
made available on the web. of the Official Directory of the European Union for Justice 
and Home Affairs allowed the interested people to leave comments and suggestions; on 
the other hand, a questionnaire on different aspects of the criminal proceedings was 
submitted to the Member States. 
After that, a meeting of experts, authorities of the Member States, lawyers 
associations, and specialists in criminal law, law professionals and representatives of non-
governmental organizations was held.  
 
After having analysed and studied the online feedback and the answers to the 
questionnaires submitted by the Member States, the experts, fundamentally the 
representatives of non-governmental organizations and law professionals came to the 
conclusion that those rights needed to be protected104. 
 
It was then confirmed that the cited safeguards already enjoyed previous 
recognition at a legal level in most of the Member States, as these had already signed the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Nevertheless, its application in practice was 
dissimilar among the Member States, a fact that justified joint action. 
 
However, the chief merit of the Green Paper was to identify the appropriate 
spheres to develop community action, spheres that were limited to five and coincided 
with those agreed on the proposal for a council framework Decision, namely: 1) access 
 
103 Document COM (2003) 75 final. 
104  For further clarification, read GALLEGO-CASILDA GRAU, Y. “El Libro Verde de la Comisión 
Europea sobre las garantías procesales para sospechosos e inculpados en procesos penales de la Unión 
Europea”, Cuadernos de Derecho Judicial XIII-2003 2004, CGPJ, Madrid, pp. 235-256. 
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to legal representation, both before the trial and at trial; 2) access to interpretation and 
translation; 3) ensuring that vulnerable suspects and accused in particular are properly 
protected; 4) consular assistance to foreign detainees; 5) notifying suspects and 
defendants of their rights  (“Letter of Rights”)105. 
 
 
4.3 The failed proposal for a Council framework Decision (2004) 
 
As a result from the Green Paper, the proposal for a council framework Decision 
on certain procedural rights in criminal proceedings throughout the European Union106 is 
formulated one year after and presented by the Commission on 28 April 2004. 
 
Although the proposal failed to achieve its legislative iter, it implied an important 
starting point with a view to harmonizing the procedural safeguards. 
 
As the regulatory scheme on criminal judicial cooperation was still of 
intergovernmental nature without implying “integration” in a strict sense (prior to the 
enforcement of the Treaty of Lisbon), the framework Decision is employed. On the 
contrary, the matters with regard to civil judicial cooperation had already been subjected 
to the community rules (following the Treaty of Amsterdam 107 ) in the shape of 
regulations, directives and decisions. 
 
The original drafting established the date 1 January 2006 as the deadline for the 
States to implement the necessary measures in order to abide by the proposal for a council 
framework Decision. However, that deadline was obviously not met due to the fact that 
the legislative procedure had not been concluded. 
 
The main goal of this proposal was to set the minimum commons standards in 
matters of procedural safeguards, generally applicable to all suspects and accused in 
criminal proceedings throughout the European Union. 
 
105 Aspects such as conditional release or impartiality on the taking of evidence were excluded for deserving 
separate further action. 
106 Document COM (2004) 0328 final. 
107 Signed on 2 October 1997 and in force since 1 May 1999 in the European area. 
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Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights 108  was taken as a 
reference, this article concerns the right to a fair trial to which all Member States are 
signatory parties. 
 
It is important to bear in mind that article 6.3 of ECHR already includes a minimal 
series of the rights of the accused, which are: a) to be informed promptly, in a language 
which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; 
b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of their defense; c) to defend 
himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not 
sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice 
so require; d) to examine or have examined witnesses against them and to obtain the 
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as 
witnesses against them; e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if they cannot 
understand or speak the language used in court. 
 
Nevertheless, the growing number of actions 109  brought before the European 
Court of Human Rights together with the conviction of some Member States for having 
infringed the right to a proceeding within a reasonable period of time, bring to light the 
fact that the enforcement of the European Convention on Human was neither absolute nor 
universal. 
 
Although the legal level of safeguards is similar in the European Union, it would 
be foremost that its application in practice shall be as uniform, an aspect that shall be 
considered in the light of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. 
 
Having said that, the ultimate objective of the Proposal, apart from the legislative 
approach, was to achieve the validity of the principle of mutual recognition. 
 
Mutual recognition essentially implies that a State shall consider orders of court 
from other Member States equivalent to its own, notwithstanding that the management of 
 
108 Signed in Rome, on 4 November 1950 in the Council of Europe. 
109 The number of actions increased in more than 500% between the years 1993 and 2000. 
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the matter itself can be different between them. Needless to say, the validity of this 
principle can only be effective in a spirit of trust in which the Member States have 
reservations about the foreign legal system and its enforcement. 
 
The European Council in Tampere, held in October 1999, had agreed to consider 
the principle of mutual recognition the “cornerstone” of judicial cooperation in both 
criminal and civil matters110. The first measure adopted on mutual recognition was on the 
European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures111. 
 
The content of this proposal was restrained to five procedural rights: right to legal 
advice (articles 2-5), right to free interpretation and translation (articles 6-9), right to 
specific attention for vulnerable suspects and accused (articles 10-11) right to 
communicate, especially with consular authorities (articles 12-13), and duty to inform of 
rights (article 14). 
 
Due to its failure, it is now not relevant to analyze the regulations of the proposal 
of the council framework Decision. Besides, those rights will be, to a large extent, subject 
of debate when examining further Directives that likewise refer to them. 
 
Notwithstanding, we would like to make some minor remarks112. For instance, the 
right to legal advice is considered the fundamental and most important right of the 
accused, as it guarantees the effectiveness of the rest. 
 
 
110 See conclusions 33, 35 and 36 of this Council. 
111 Framework Decision 2002/584/JAI, of 13 June 2002 (OJ, 18 July 2002, n. L 190, pp 1-20). 
112 For a more detailed analysis, see our previous studies: VALBUENA GONZÁLEZ, F. “La Propuesta de 
Decisión Marco del Consejo relativa a determinados derechos procesales en los procesos penales 
celebrados en la Unión Europea”, Diario La Ley 2006, n. 6564, pp. 1-5; VALBUENA GONZÁLEZ, F. 
“Derechos procesales del imputado”, en M. Jimeno Bulnes (ed.), La cooperación judicial civil y penal en 
el ámbito de la Unión Europea: instrumentos procesales, Bosch Editor, Barcelona, 2007, pp. 395-416; also, 
VALBUENA GONZÁLEZ, F. “Adaptación de la Propuesta de Decisión Marco sobre Garantías Procesales 
al ordenamiento jurídico español”, in M. De Hoyos Sancho (ed.), El proceso penal en la Unión Europea: 
garantías esenciales, Lex Nova, Valladolid, 2008, pp. 169-177. Also, JIMENO BULNES, M., “The 
Proposal for Council a Framework Decision on certain procedural rights in criminal proceedings troughout 
the European Union”, in E. Guild y F. Geyer (eds.), Security versus Justice? Police and judicial cooperation 
in the EU: which future for EU’s third pillar, Ashgate, Aldershot (Hampshire) 2008, pp.171-202. 
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For its part, the right to free interpretation and translation is related to the rights 
of the suspects or accused to be informed of the case against them so that they are enabled 
to defend themselves113. 
 
With regard to the specific attention to vulnerable suspects and accused, it should 
be noted that this attention is also envisaged for those unable to understand the content or 
significance of the judicial proceedings for reasons of age, mental, physical or emotional 
condition114. 
 
Moreover, information about the whereabouts of the individuals deprived of 
liberty due to interim relief shall be provided (within the shortest time possible) to their 
relatives, entitled persons or working place. In the case of foreigners, the information can 
be provided to the consular authorities of the State of origin, with whom they had the 
right to communicate. 
 
Finally, the last safeguard included in the Proposal deals with the information 
provided to the accused on his rights, in the shape of a new model of “Letter of Rights” 
that shall always be immediately delivered before the police questioning takes place. 
 
As it was foreseen, the proposal for a council framework Decision was never fully 
developed. In a second attempt, in the middle of 2006, it was even agreed to continue 
working on a transactional proposal by the Presidency of the Council of the European 
Union 115  with the intention of overcoming the existing resistance and reaching a 
unanimous agreement. 
 
In comparison with the original proposal, the former pursued to limit the number 
of rights and their scope, focusing on general rules and avoiding a detailed specification 
 
113 For further clarification, read JIMENO BULNES, M. “El derecho a la interpretación y traducción 
gratuitas”, Diario La Ley 2007, n. 6671, pp. 1-10. 
114  For further clarification, read DE HOYOS SANCHO, M. “Acerca de la necesidad de armonizar 
garantías procesales de los sospechosos en la Unión Europea: especial consideración de los grupos 
vulnerables”, Revista de Derecho y Proceso Penal 2007, n. 18, pp. 117-142.  
115 According to the Agreement of the Council of Justice and Home Affairs, 2732 Council Meeting, held in 
Luxemburg, 1 and 2 June 2006. (Press release 9409/06, Presse 144,  released on the occasion of the cited 
Council of Justice and Home Affairs, p. 14, available on 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/89875.pdf (last access on 31 
May 2019). 
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on the way each Member State should exercise those rights, having considered the 
differences observed in the existing procedural systems. 
 
The spheres in which the Presidency decided to keep minimum common standards 
were the following: right to information, right to legal aid, right to interpretation and right 
to the translation of all procedural documents for all the accused. Not even with this 
reduction of the rights addressed could the initiative succeed, being finally abandoned. 
 
 
4.4 The Directives arising from Roadmap strengthen the procedural rights of suspects and 
accused in criminal proceedings (2009) 
 
Having acknowledged the failure of the debates in the previous years, which did 
not lead to any particular result, a new course on the matter is initiated through the 
Resolution of the Council of 30 November 2009 on a Roadmap for strengthening 
procedural rights of suspected or accused persons in criminal proceedings116. 
The starting point of this new plan continues to be the expected safeguards in the 
European Convention on Human Rights, pursuant to the interpretation by the European 
Court of Human Rights, as a common basis for the systems of criminal law in the Member 
States. 
 
The pursued goal is still to provide the principle of mutual recognition of the 
court’s decisions through the achievement of minimum common standards on procedural 
aspects. 
 
However, even when the premises of this Decision117 do not differ from those 
expected in the proposal for a council framework Decision, a change of direction in the 
system of action is observed. 
 
 
116 OJ, 4 December 2009, C 295, pp. 1-3. 
117 For further clarification, read JIMENO BULNES, M. “The EU Roadmap for Strengthening Procedural 
Rights of Suspected or Accused Persons in Criminal Proceedings”, Eucrim 2009, n. 4, pp. 157-161; also, 
JIMENO BULNES, M. “Towards Common Standards on Rights of Suspected and Accused Persons in 
Criminal Proceedings in the EU?”, CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe 2010, pp. 1-20. 
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The method of addressing a body of safeguards in a whole text is no longer 
employed, and it is now replaced with an approach that addresses them separately based 
on their importance and complexity with the pretext to grant each of them some added 
value 
 
Monnet’s “step by step” technique is here employed, a method that once enabled 
the creation of the European Communities and has provided advances in matters of 
integration118. 
 
The isolated management of the rights successively in time, entails the dangers of 
a lack of coherence on the whole, which is to be avoided by taking as a reference the 
minimum standards stipulated by the European Council of Human Rights according to 
the interpretation of the European Court of Human Rights. 
 
However, the Roadmap prioritizes a series of procedural rights that that are 
considered essential, namely: a) translation and interpreting; b) information about rights 
and charges; c) legal advice and free justice; d) communication with relatives, employer 
and consular authorities; e) special safeguards for vulnerable suspects or accused; f) 
provisional arrest. 
 
The Council invites the Commission to suggest measures for the first five rights 
and a Green Paper on the provisional arrest every time the situation of deprivation of 
liberty is considerably different in the Member States. 
 
First and foremost, the Council commits to studying all proposals put forward as 
a priority and to subsequently act in cooperation with the European Parliament and the 
Council of Europe. 
 
Nevertheless, the Council does not only extend the invitation to the Commission 
with a view to reaching compromises, but also dares to give instructions on the scope and 
 
118 This technique can be understood following Monnet’s words: "Europe will not be made all at once, […] 
it will be built through concrete achievements”. 
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content of those rights which show a decrease in the rights with regard to the proposal for 
a council framework Decision. 
 
Independently of the assessment of the Commission, the measures have been 
taking shape in the form of six Directives, which we will be chronologically analysed in 
the following lines in order of publication. 
 
 
4.4.1      Directive on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings 
(2010) 
 
The first implemented initiative (following the order of the safeguards presented 
in the Roadmap) was Directive 2010/64/UE, of 20 October 2010, of the European 
Parliament and the Council on the on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal 
proceedings119, promoted at the request of several Member States, including Spain. 
 
The right to interpretation and translation is not only guaranteed in the criminal 
proceedings of the European Union, but also in proceedings for the execution of a 
European arrest warrant and surrender120. 
 
Temporarily, the acknowledgement of those rights starts the moment the 
competent authorities of a Member State inform about a suspect or an accused of having 
committed an offence and lasts until the end of the proceedings. That is, during the course 
of the criminal proceedings, widely speaking, and including the criminal investigations 
and the police interview, especially for the purposes of interpretation. 
 
From a subjective perspective, both the suspect and the accused that do not speak 
the language of the proceedings or have hearing difficulties remain protected, and not 
only when communicating with the investigation and judicial authorities (police force, 
prosecutors or judges) but also with their legal counsel. 
 
 
119 OJ, n. L 280, 26 October 2010, pp. 1-7. 
120 Articles 1.1, 2.5 and 3.5. 
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Linguistic assistance by a professional sharing the mother tongue of the 
individuals or any other that they can understand and speak and allows them full 
competence to exercise their rights of defence cannot be waived. 
 
The Directive particularly emphasizes the extent of this safeguard to the 
conversations with the suspect or accused with their legal counsel in direct connection 
with any questioning or hearing during the proceedings or with the lodging of an appeal 
or other procedural applications in order to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings121. 
 
When it comes to translation, the right extends to all essential documents, such as 
any decision depriving a person of his liberty, any charge or indictment and, in the case 
of surrender procedures between the Member States, the European arrest warrant. 
Nevertheless, the suspect or accused or their legal counsel can demand upon request the 
translation of other documents that likewise safeguard the effective exercise of the 
defence.  
Even when the Council Resolutions on the Roadmap omitted any reference to the 
cost-free status of the service, the Directive stipulates that the Member States shall defray 
the costs of interpretation and translation, irrespective of the outcome of the 
proceeding122. 
 
In comparison with the former proposal for a council framework Decision, the 
Directive positively addresses the possibility to challenge an adverse decision, either 
regarding the quality of the interpretation service or the quality of the translation of any 
given essential document123. 
 
On the contrary, a failure to meet the standards required with regard to the quality 
of the services of translation and interpreting is also observed.124 Currently, the Member 
 
121 Article 2.2 and Recitals 19 and 20. The CJEU has given a preliminary ruling with regard to this right in 
relation with the lawyer, limiting it to oral statements (CJEU, 15 October 2015, Covaci, C-2016/14, 
EU:C:2015:686) 
122 Article 4 and Recital 17. 
123 Articles 2.5 and 3.5. 
124 On this subject, read VIDAL FERNÁNDEZ, B. “El derecho a intérprete y a la traducción en los procesos 
penales en la Unión Europea”, in, C. Arangüena Fanego (ed.), Espacio europeo de libertad, seguridad y 
justicia: últimos avances en cooperación judicial penal, Lex Nova, Valladolid, 2010, pp. 183-222, esp. pp. 
203 ff. 
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States shall only provide the necessary means to guarantee these services. Formerly, 
professional and qualified translators and interpreters were required for this purpose and, 
in the event of mal praxis, were subject of substitution. Besides, their interventions could 
likewise be subject to be recorded in order to verify their accuracy. 
 
 
4.4.2      Directive on the right to information in criminal proceedings (2012) 
 
The second initiative of the Roadmap was Directive 2012/13/UE, of 22 May 2012, 
of the European Parliament and the Council on the right to information in criminal 
proceedings125, and whose distinctive feature is that it is both a procedural right and a 
prerequisite for the effective exercise of the rest of the procedural rights acknowledged to 
suspects. 
 
The minimum content of this right in this Directive distinguishes three aspects: 
firstly, the right to information on rights and procedural safeguards; secondly, information 
on the accusation; and finally, the right to free access to the materials of the case. 
 
Concerning the first aspect, all suspects and or accused of having committed a 
crime shall be provided with the rights the Directive deems essential, namely: the right of 
access to a lawyer, free legal advice, information of the accusation, interpretation and 
translation and the right to remain silent126. 
 
Most of these rights are guaranteed by the Member States pursuant to the 
compliance of other Directives, which we will later examine, except for the right to be 
informed of the accusation, a right that has its own regulation in this same Directive. 
 
 
125 OJ, n. L 142, 1 June 2012, pp. 1-10. 
126 Article 3.1 and Recital 19. To this list of essential rights, the presumption of innocence shall be added 
after the entry into force of Directive 2016/343 of 9 March, which strengthens specific aspects of the 
presumption of innocence in the criminal proceedings, together with the right to be present at a trial. On 
this subject, read SERRANO MASSIP, M. “Directiva relativa al derecho a la información en los procesos 
penales”, in M. Jimeno Bulnes (dir.), R. Miguel Barrio (ed.),  Espacio Judicial Europeo y Proceso Penal, 
op. cit., pp. 219-248, esp. pp. 232 ff. 
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The above-cited information shall be promptly provided, at the latest before the 
first official interview in a language that the individual understands and in plain language 
in accordance with the age and maturity condition of the suspect. 
 
When dealing with suspects, the information must be, as a general rule, provided 
in writing, with the “Letter of Rights” in the language that the suspect can understand. In 
order to help with its transposition, the Directive provides the Member States different, 
optional models. The second model is aimed at persons arrested for the purpose of the 
execution of a European arrest warrant. 
 
The individuals arrested or deprived of liberty shall generally be informed about 
their right of access to the materials of the case, the right to have consular authorities and 
one person informed, urgent medical assistance, the maximum number of hours or days 
they may be deprived of liberty before being brought before a judicial authority, and the 
right to challenge the lawfulness of the arrest, obtain a review of the detention, or make a 
request for provisional release127. 
 
With regard to the second aspect, the right to be informed of the accusation, three 
different situations in which the passive part of the criminal proceedings can stand are 
distinguished: suspect, arrested and accused individuals. 
 
Suspects only have the right to be informed about the criminal act they have 
committed, whereas the arrested and deprived of liberty individuals have the right to be 
informed of the reasons for their arrest or deprivation of liberty including the criminal act 
they are suspected of having committed. For their part, the accused shall be given a 
detailed description of the offence, its nature, legal classification and the kind of their 
participation in them128. 
 
Accused persons shall be provided with the information on the accusation at the 
latest on submission of the merits of the accusation to a court (Art. 6.3), a fact that the 
CJEU understood in the sense that communication of the charges shall be provided before 
 
127 Articles 4.2 and 4.3. 
128 Article 6. 
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the court begins to examine the merits of the charges so that the accused has enough time 
to prepare an effective defence129. 
 
Finally, and with regard to the third aspect, the free access to the materials of the 
case, the legislator expects to reach two goals. On the one hand, the possibility to actually 
and legally motivate the challenge of the legality of the arrest and, on the other, the full 
exercise of the right to defence and validity of the audi alteram partem rule130. 
 
 
4.4.3      Directive on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings (2013) 
 
In the third place in chronological order, among the tools to harmonize the 
procedural safeguards for suspects and accused, the European Parliament and the Council 
approved Directive 2013/48/UE, of 22 October 2013, on the right of access to a lawyer 
in criminal proceedings and in European arrest warrant proceedings, and on the right to 
have a third party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to communicate with third 
persons and with consular authorities while deprived of liberty.131 
 
It is important to highlight that the proposal for a council framework Decision 
(2004) considered the access to a lawyer the first and most important right of the accused, 
as it guarantees the rest of the acknowledged safeguards. However, the Council 
Resolution of 30 November 2009 relegates this right to a third position in the chronology 
of action to the benefit of others such as translation and interpretation and the information 
on rights, as it was brought to light132. 
 
However, this Directive does not confine its scope of application to the right of 
access to a lawyer, but also extends it to other rights in connection with the possibility of 
 
129 CJEU (Grand Chamber) of 6 June 2018, Kolev, C-612/15, EU:C:2018;392 
130 On this subject, read SERRANO MASSIP, M. “Directiva relativa al derecho a la información en los 
procesos penales”, in M. Jimeno Bulnes (dir.), R. Miguel Barrio (ed.) Espacio Judicial Europeo y Proceso 
Penal,  op. cit., esp. pp. 241 ff. 
131 OJ, n. L 294, 6 November 2013, pp. 1-2. 
132 Our previous work already approached this change of perspective: VALBUENA GONZÁLEZ, F., 
“Garantías procesales en la orden de detención europea”, in M. Jimeno Bulnes (ed.), Justicia versus 
seguridad en el espacio judicial europeo. Orden de detención europea y garantías procesales, op. cit. pp. 
201-229, esp. pp. 228 and 229. 
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communicating with the outside during the period of deprivation of liberty, such as 
informing a third party of the condition or communication with consular authorities. 
 
The right of access to a lawyer is the first right that serves as the basis from which 
the minimum common standards are agreed, especially with regard to the moment this 
right shall be exercised, its content, the way it is exercised, its waiver or confidentiality133. 
 
Therefore, suspects and accused have the right to have access to a lawyer without 
undue delay, from the very first stages of the proceedings so that their rights of defence 
can be practically and effectively exercised. The access to a lawyer shall be provided 
before any of the following circumstances take place: police or judicial questioning, the 
carrying out of any investigative or other evidence-gathering act, deprivation of liberty or 
the moment they have been summoned to appear before a court with jurisdiction. 
  
One of the most relevant aspects of the Directive is the moment when the right to 
have access to a lawyer shall start to be exercised, as it faces dissimilar procedural 
practices among the Member States134. 
With regard to the content of this right, the access to a lawyer entails, at least, 
these three aspects: the private meeting and communication with the lawyer representing 
the suspect or accused prior to the police or judicial questioning; secondly, the presence 
and active participation of the lawyer during the questioning and thirdly, the lawyer’s 
attendance to any investigative or evidence-gathering acts such as identity parades, 
confrontations and reconstructions of the scene of the crime. 
 
Even when not mentioned explicitly, we understand that the right of access to a 
lawyer starts in the pre-trial proceedings and extends to the conclusion of the proceedings, 
so that the accused shall likewise have access to a lawyer during the trial and, if 
 
133 Articles 3, 9 and 4, respectively. 
134 Depending on the State, the right to have Access to a lawyer does not start to be exercised the moment 
a police arrest takes place. On the contrary, it can be delayed for some time, as it has been observed in the 
case of la garde à vue in the French Law. Besides, arrests during the weekend or at certain hours can 
likewise pose problems in this same context. On this subject, read ARANGÜENA FANEGO, C. “El 
derecho a la asistencia letrada en la Directiva 2013/48/UE”, Revista General de Derecho Europeo 2014, n. 
32, pp. 1-3, esp. 20. Available on: http//:www.iustel.com.  
57 
applicable, when bringing an appeal against the final resolution, pursuant to the general 
scope and the application of the time frames of the rights in the Directive135. 
 
Special attention is paid to respecting the confidentiality of the communication 
between suspects or accused and their lawyers, not only on the occasion of their meetings 
but also in the exchange of correspondence, telephone conversations and other forms of 
communication allowed. 
 
It shall be advised that, the access to a lawyer is considered an inalienable right 
for the suspect or accused. Having said that, the waiver is subject to the satisfaction of 
certain requirements; on the one hand, the individual should have been informed about 
the content and the possible consequences of waiving this right and; on the other hand, 
that the waiver is to be given voluntarily and unequivocally either in writing or orally and 
it shall always be noted136. 
 
Following the right to have access to a lawyer, the Directive deals with other rights 
exclusively applicable to suspects and accused deprived of liberty, such as informing a 
third party or communicating with third persons or consular authorities. 
 
In this way, suspects or accused have the right to inform a third party about their 
deprivation of liberty without undue delay.137 This information shall be provided to a 
relative or employer nominated by the interested party, or even to even to any other 
person, a friend or acquaintance. This right that can be waived by nature (except for 
people below the age of 18 years), as the individuals may prefer not to inform anybody 
about their condition. 
 
The contact with the outside of the individual deprived of liberty does not end 
with the communication with another person about their condition but extends to their 
 
135  Article 2.1 in fine: “The Directive […] applies until the conclusion of the proceedings, which is 
understood to mean the final determination of the question whether the suspect or accused person has 
committed the offence, including, where applicable, sentencing and the resolution of any appeal. 
136 On this matter, read VALBUENA GONZÁLEZ, F. “Directiva relativa al derecho a la asistencia letrada 
en los procesos penales”, in M. Jimeno Bulnes (dir.), R. Miguel Barrio (ed.) Espacio Judicial Europeo y 
Proceso Penal, op. cit., pp. 249-261, esp. pp. 254 ff. 
137 Article 5. 
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right to communicate personally with other third parties, including the consular 
authorities138. 
 
Hence, suspects or accused deprived of liberty have the right to communicate 
without undue delay with, at least, a third party of their choice, for instance a relative. 
Under this same circumstance, non-nationals have the right to inform the consular 
authorities about their deprivation of liberty without undue delay and to communicate 
with them139. 
 
The contact with the consular authorities is not limited to providing information 
about the deprivation of liberty and possible communication, but it also extends to the 
right to receive visits, have conversations and keep correspondence with these authorities 
with a view to providing the individual legal representation, on the condition that both 
the authorities and the suspect or accused agree and wish to do so. 
 
The Directive ultimately enshrines the right of access to a lawyer in European 
arrest warrant proceedings140, which, strictly speaking, is not a different safeguard from 
the right to access to a lawyer, but its application in this specific case. 
 
If appropriate, the rest of the rights included in the Directive, apart from the right 
to access a lawyer, which are the right to inform about the deprivation of liberty to a third 
person of the choice of the suspect or accused and the right to communicate with third 
parties, including the consular authorities, are also applicable to the proceedings of a 




138 Articles 7 and 8. 
139  “The right of suspects and accused persons who are deprived of liberty to consular assistance is 
enshrined in Article 36 of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations where it is a right conferred 
on States to have access to their nationals”. (Recital 37) 
140 Article 10. 
141  For further clarification, read JIMENO BULNES, M. “La Directiva 2013/48/UE del Parlamento 
Europeo y del Consejo de 22 de octubre de 2013 sobre los derechos de asistencia letrada y comunicación 
en el proceso penal: ¿realidad al fin?”, op. cit., pp. 443-489. 
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4.4.4      Directive on the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the 
trial in criminal proceedings (2016) 
 
After the three previously examined Directives were approved in the period 2010-
2013, a second working stage in the cited Roadmap is initiated with the publication in 
2016 of three new Directives in connection with the procedural safeguards of suspects or 
accused in criminal proceedings. 
 
Following a chronological order, the first Directive to be published was Directive 
2016/343/EU, of 9 March 2016, of the European Parliament and Council on the 
strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be 
present at the trial in criminal proceedings142. 
 
Even from its proposal, this Directive has been the object of harsh criticism. On 
the one hand, because it is not limited to establishing rules on the presumption of 
innocence but also contemplates aspects on the right to be present at a trail, going beyond 
the Roadmap drawn by the Council back in 2009. On the other hand, its provisions 
formulate general law principles instead of providing the procedural framework to protect 
the rights of suspects and accused, a fact that complicates its own transposition143. 
 
With regard to its content, the provisions in connection with the presumption of 
innocence present a double approach: extra-procedural and procedural.144 Concerning its 
extra-procedural side, the authorities are demanded to treat the accused pursuant to the 
safeguard, avoiding considering him guilty in public statements until the individual has 
been convicted in true form of law. Along these lines, the Member States are required to 
adopt measures to guarantee that the jurisdictional authorities abstain from presenting 
 
142 OJ, n. L65, 11 March 2016, pp 1-11. 
143  On this matter, read ARANGÜENA FANEGO, C., “Las directivas europeas de armonización de 
garantías procesales de investigados y acusados. Su implementación en el Derecho español”, Revista de 
Estudios Europeos 2019, n. 1, pp .5-40, esp. p. 24. Available on: http://www.ree-uva.es. 
144 On this matter, read the distinction addressed in GUERRERO PALOMARES, S. “Algunas cuestiones y 
propuestas sobre la construcción teórica del derecho a la presunción de inocencia, a la luz de la Directiva 
2016/343, de 9 de marzo, del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, por la que se refuerzan en el proceso 
penal determinados aspectos de la presunción de inocencia y del derecho a estar presente en el juicio”, in 
C. Arangüena Fanego y M. De Hoyos Sancho (eds.), Garantías procesales de investigados y acusados. 
Situación actual en el ámbito de la Unión Europea, Tirant, Valencia, 2018, pp. 143-175, esp. pp. 150 ff. 
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suspects or accused as being guilty before the jurisdictional authorities and audience 
through the use of measures of physical restraint145. 
 
In connection with its procedural side, it shall be ensured that the burden of the 
proof for establishing the guilt of suspects and accused persons is on the prosecution; 
likewise, suspects and accused should be likewise given the benefit of the doubt. Suspects 
and accused shall have the right to remain silent and not to incriminate themselves. The 
exercise of this right shall not be evidence that they have committed a criminal offence146. 
The Directive also deals with the right to be present at the trial147, requiring the 
Member States to ensure this safeguard. Nevertheless, this is not an absolute right, as the 
trial can take place without the presence of the accused as long as certain requirements 
are met, namely: informing the suspect or accused of date and place of the trial, of the 
consequences of the non-appearance and of the possibility of a mandate to a lawyer to 
represent him or her at the trial. 
 
However, when suspects and accused have not been present at the trial, these shall 




4.4.5      Directive on procedural safeguards for children who are suspects or accused in 
criminal proceedings (2016) 
 
This new Directive 2016/800/EU, of 11 May 2016, on procedural safeguards for 
children who are suspects or accused in criminal proceedings is published in compliance 
with Measure E) of the Roadmap (special safeguards for suspected or accused persons 
who are vulnerable)149. 
 
 
145 Articles 4 and 5. 
146 Articles 6 and 7. 
147 The incorporation of this right to the Directive primarily arises from the conflicts on the application on 
the European arrest warrant of individuals imprisoned in absentia. See Judgment of CJEU (Grand 
Chamber) of 26 February 2016, case C-399, Melloni, EU:C:2013:107. 
148 Articles 8 and 9. 
149 OJ, n. L 132, 21 May 2016, pp 1-19. 
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The main goal of this Directive is to establish minimum common standards for 
certain children who are suspects or accused in a criminal proceeding or are subject to an 
arrest warrant so that they can understand and follow the proceedings in order to allow 
them to exercise their right to a fair trial, prevent their relapse and foster their social 
insertion150. 
 
To this effect, all persons under the age of eighteen years are considered minors 
at the moment of committing the punishable offence and are subject to criminal 
proceedings or requested in European arrest warrant proceedings.  
 
Despite this fact, the Directive is not applicable until the final decision determines 
whether the suspect or accused has committed the criminal offence, including, when 
applicable, the sentencing and the resolution of any appeal.151 Moreover, the Member 
States are requested to maintain the safeguards for minors when they become eighteen 
years before the criminal proceedings and until the moment they become twenty-one152.  
 
Particularly, the Directive incorporates a series of rights that strengthen the 
personal status of the investigated minor with respect to the adult, namely: the right to be 
accurately informed, which includes informing the holder of parental responsibility who 
can accompany the minor during the proceedings153; the right to a lawyer and to legal 
aid154; the right to an individual assessment155 where the child’s personality and maturity 
shall specially be taken into account, the child’s economic, social and family background 
together with any specific vulnerability; the right to a medical examination156 without any 
undue delay with a view, in particular, to assessing the child’s mental and physical 
condition; the right to audiovisual recording of the questionings157; the limitation of 
deprivation of liberty limited to the shortest period of time and subject to periodical 
 
150 On this, read JIMÉNEZ MARTÍN, J. “Garantías procesales de los menores sospechosos o acusados en 
el proceso penal. Cuestiones derivadas de la Directiva 2016/800/UE, de 11 de mayo”, en C. Arangüena 
Fanego y M. De Hoyos Sancho (eds.), Garantías procesales de investigados y acusados. Situación actual 
en el ámbito de la Unión Europea, op. cit.,  pp. 177-200. 
151 Article 2.1. 
152 Article 3.1. 
153 Articles 4, 5 and 15. 
154 Articles 6 and 18. 
155 Article 7. 
156 Article 8. 
157 Article 9. 
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reviews158; the right to a timely and diligent treatment of the case159; the right to the 
protection of privacy160 in court hearings involving children held in the absence of public; 
and finally, the right of the child to appear in person and to effectively participate in the 
trial161, by being given the opportunity to be heard and to express his or her views. 
 
 
4.4.6      Directive on legal aid (2016) 
 
The last step towards the European harmonization of procedural safeguards has 
been Directive 2016/1919/UE, of 26 October 2016, of the European Parliament and the 
Council on legal aid for suspects and accused persons in criminal proceedings and for 
requested persons in European arrest warrant proceedings162. 
 
Its publication constitutes a good example of the difficulties encountered until the 
Roadmap’s culmination in 2009. Although its content was already included in Measure 
C of the cited Roadmap, the right to legal aid was not included in Directive 2013/48 on 
legal aid, it was published three years after163. 
 
‘Legal aid’ means funding by a Member State of the assistance of a lawyer, 
enabling the exercise of the right of access to a lawyer164. 
 
The Directive includes minimum standards that apply to suspects and accused in 
criminal proceedings that are deprived of liberty, are required to be assisted by a lawyer 
in accordance with Union or national law, or are required or permitted to attend an 
investigative or evidence-gathering act. Likewise, the Directive is also applicable to 
individuals who are the subject of a European investigation order or suspects or accused 
that were not initially suspects or accused but become so in the course of questioning165. 
 
158 Articles 10, 11 and 12. 
159 Article 13. 
160 Article 14. 
161 Article 16. 
162 OJ, n. L 297, 4 November 2016, pp 1-8. 
163 For further clarification, read VIDAL FERNÁNDEZ, B. “La aplicación de la Directiva 2016/1919 sobre 
asistencia jurídica gratuita a los sospechosos y acusados y a las personas buscada por una OEyDE”, in C. 
Arangüena Fanego y M. De Hoyos Sancho (eds.), Garantías procesales de investigados y acusados. 
Situación actual en el ámbito de la Unión Europea, op. cit., pp. 201-234. 
164 Article 3. 
165 Article 2. 
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Decisions on whether or not to grant legal aid and on the assignment of lawyers 
shall be made, without undue delay, by a competent authority. It shall also be ensured 
that, in the event their request for legal aid is refused in full or in part, suspects accused 
shall be informed in writing so that they can have an effective remedy166. 
 
The Member States shall apply a means test, a merits test, or both in order to 
determine, whether legal aid is to be granted. 
 
With regard to the means test and in order to determine whether a suspect or an 
accused person lacks sufficient resources to pay for the assistance of a lawyer, all 
pertinent factors such as the income, capital and family situation of the person concerned, 
as well as the costs of the assistance of a lawyer and the standard of living in that Member 
State shall be taken into account. 
 
On the other hand, when a merits test is applied and in order to determine whether 
the interests of justice require legal aid to be granted the seriousness of the criminal 
offence, the complexity of the case and the severity of the sanction at stake, shall be taken 
into account. 
Attention shall likewise be paid to two significant aspects: appropriate funding 
from the Member States to ensure and effective legal aid system of an adequate quality 
and suitable training to the lawyers involved in the decision-making on legal aid, and their 










166 Articles 6 and 8. 
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